
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS AND REGULATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A SUBJECT OF CONTROVERSY

¹*Nwanolue, Bonn Obiekwe Godwin and* ²*Victor Chidubem Iwuoha*

¹*Department of Political Science, Anambra State University, Igbariam Campus*

²*Department of Political Science University of Nigeria, Nsukka*

E-mail: tchydubevick@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

The twenty first century armed conflicts, have witnessed great loss of human lives and properties. Equally, the international law of war, which includes the four Geneva convention of 1949, two additional protocols of 1977, the 1980 United Nations declaration prohibiting the use of dangerous weapons in war, have been grossly violated in the of nations, at the center stage of world politics. Hence, the Ballum Jusum theory queries the effectiveness of law of armed conflicts in regulating weapons of mass destruction, especially in warfare. Accordingly, this paper examines Weapons of Mass Destruction, Chemical warfare, Biological warfare, Bacteriological Warfare, Total Protection from Chemical or Biological Attack, Detection and Shelter, Decontamination and Treatment, The law as it relates to Weapons, Protection of United Nations Forces and Humanitarian Organizations from the Effects of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices and the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti – personnel Mines and on their Destruction (the Ottawa treaty)

INTRODUCTION

The international law relating or cognate to the attenuation of warfare excesses dates back to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions respectively, being the first codification of this aspect of law. Christopher, (2005:59) posits that the law of war derives its name "Hague Law" from the Hague convention. Accordingly, both the Leber Code and the Declaration of St. Petersburg, laid the foundation for the Law of Hague, which is currently known as Law of Armed Conflicts and was written in 1868. According to Ajayi (2008:97) "The law of war tends to set limit or circumscribe the conducts of military operation. Its rules are meant to attenuate and control or curtail the death and destruction as far as possible. It establishes also the rights and duties of the belligerents in the conducts of operations and circumscribes the choice of means to injure the enemy". International humanitarian law deals principally with situations of war or more precisely, situations of armed conflicts. Another name for IHL is therefore the Law of Armed Conflicts. Its main objective is to control and limit weapons and methods of International warfare and conduct of hostilities on humanitarian grounds. (Ajala and Sagay 1998:24) Further, the law of armed conflicts goes to the extent of indicting war criminals and meting out adequate punishments for them. Therefore, in accordance with international law of armed conflicts, Chemical and Biological Warfare, use of harmful or deadly chemical or biological agents as weapons of war can kill and are considered weapons of mass destruction in international relations. Chemical weapons are made up of poisonous chemical compounds, whereas biological weapons use living microorganisms. Again, weapons that contain the poisonous chemical products of living

organisms are known as toxin weapons and are sometimes classified separately. Chemical and biological weapons can cause injury in several ways. Adeyemi, (2009:22) opines that most cause injury or death when inhaled, and some cause injury through contact with skin or through ingestion of contaminated food. Chemical or biological attack usually involves dispersing agents into the air. This can be done in various ways, such as firing artillery shells that burst in midair, or using airplanes to spray the agents over an area especially during an international armed conflict. In the 20th century, chemicals were used extensively as battlefield weapons especially in World War I, (1914-1918) and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). The release of the nerve agent sarin in a Tokyo subway in 1995, was a rare terrorist chemical attack. The mailing of anthrax bacteria to government and news media offices in the United States, in 2001, was a rare terrorist biological attack. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention are the most recent international agreements prohibiting these types of weapons. Both have been signed by many countries. Nevertheless, Burton & Tillet (1991:21) contend that following the Iran-Iraq War, more countries began to secretly develop chemical and biological weapons, and the threat of their use has become greater. Iraq in particular was accused of stockpiling such weapons. Iraqi resistance to United Nations (UN) weapons inspections in the late 1990s led to a new round of inspections in late 2002 and early 2003. The administration of United States president George W. Bush, however, decided that the Iraqi regime of President Saddam Hussein had failed to cooperate with weapons inspectors and was attempting to conceal its chemical and biological weapons. In March 2003, the United States and Britain invaded Iraq and overthrew the Hussein government. However, according to Sydney, (2005:34) the dethronement of Saddam Hussein by the United States and Great Britain, did not serve as a glaring deterrence to some other countries of the world that are proposing to embark and or have embarked on development of nuclear power capabilities. For instance, Iran, Syria, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, Lebanon, to mention but a few, are currently posing great threats to world peace and general harmony. Hence, this paper has set out to examine the effectiveness of the international law of armed conflicts in regulating weapons of mass destruction in the 21st century international relations. Thus, this will ensure an enhanced global peace and security through disarmament.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Critical Appraisal

In our consideration of the principles of law of armed conflicts, the applications of weapons are still apt, up to this modern global strategic development. For the purpose of clarity, we shall look into these weapons as regards their regulations and in line with the principles of the law governing armed conflicts.

Chemical Warfare

Chemical warfare involves the use of chemical compounds to kill or seriously injure an enemy. Several countries began eliminating their chemical weapons stockpiled in the 1990s, but the threat of their use still exists. In the words of Pogany, (1987:8) chemical warfare agents can be grouped into two general types: those that affect the body surfaces they contact, and those that damage the general nervous system. Surface agents

include phosgene gas, chlorine gas, hydrogen cyanide, and mustard gas. The principal action of phosgene, chlorine, and hydrogen cyanide occurs through inhalation. Phosgene is a choking agent that causes the lungs to fill with water, while chlorine destroys the cells that line the respiratory tract. Hydrogen cyanide blocks oxygen from reaching the blood during armed conflicts. Bowett, (1964:83) maintains that mustard gas is actually composed of tiny droplets of liquid that are dispersed in the air, where they are inhaled like a gas. Mustard is a blistering agent that damages any surface it contacts, including the skin, eyes, and lungs. It may cause death by respiratory failure. Again, nerve agents act by blocking the transmission of nerve messages throughout the body. These agents include sarin, soman, tabun, and VX. All act by disrupting the normal action of a neurotransmitter called acetylcholine. Whether inhaled or absorbed through the skin, a single drop of nerve agent can shut down the body's nervous system and weaken the opponent in any civil war. The most powerful of this group is VX, but all can cause death within minutes after exposure. Example was the U.S Vietnam crisis of 1954-1974, in which the U.S suffered a celebrated defeat as a result of the application of these agents on their army. Fessler, (1989:21) provides that herbicides, such as Agent Orange, are chemicals that kill vegetation. Agent Orange was also used during the US / Vietnam War (1954-1974) as a defoliant, destroying jungle leaves to expose enemy troops. Some people regard herbicides as chemical weapons if used for hostile purposes, but there is no universal agreement about this, since herbicides are not directly intended to harm humans or animals. However, veterans of the Vietnam War suffered several health problems blamed on exposure to Agent Orange and other toxins, and the Vietnamese government charged that civilians were harmed by exposure to Agent Orange. Equally, it should be noted that large-scale use of chemical weapons first occurred in 1915 during World War I, when German troops released chlorine gas from cylinders as the wind blew toward French lines a few hundred yards away. The yellow-green cloud enveloped the French soldiers, who choked and panicked. As the war continued, phosgene and other chemical weapons were used, culminating with Germany's introduction of mustard gas in 1917. By the end of the war in 1918, all the major powers had used chemical weapons. The suffering caused by the gas attacks led to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which banned the use of chemical or bacteriological agents in war. Although most major countries became parties to the agreement, the United States declined to until 1975. Nevertheless, the Protocol encouraged an international norm that helped deter the use of these weapons.

Biological Warfare

Biological weapons are a unique class of weapons and living microorganisms. These biological agents represent a dangerous military threat because they are alive, and are therefore unpredictable and uncontrollable once released. This is one important reason that biological weapons have rarely been used. Biological warfare agents, according to Geoffrey, (1980:38) include bacteria, viruses, fungi, and other microorganisms that can kill or incapacitate. Since they can reproduce, biological agents have the unique potential to make an environment more dangerous over time. If used for hostile purposes, any disease-causing microorganism could be considered a weapon. For the purposes of warfare, specific characteristics of certain agents make them more likely to be used than others.

Smith, (2005:96) affirms that some potential warfare agents can make their victims very sick without necessarily killing them. Examples include the microorganisms that cause tularemia, Q fever and yellow fever. After suffering debilitating illness, victims of these diseases often recover, although not always. Other agents are more likely to be lethal. Okolo (2007:38) argues that the bacteria that cause bubonic plague and the virus that causes smallpox can kill large numbers of untreated people in any form of armed conflicts.

Bacteriological Warfare

Although the United States has never used poison gases or bacteriological weapons in war, it has not been willing to become a party to the treaty expressly prohibiting their use. In 1925 the United States participated in the drawing up of the Geneva Protocol, but it never ratified the treaty and thus is not bound by it. Clement (2008:26) contends that the Geneva Protocol prohibits 'the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices' and 'the use of bacteriological methods of warfare' but does not make unlawful the testing, production, or stockpiling of these weapons. Accordingly, the protocol prohibits their use in international war but not in civil wars or in domestic disturbances, in which the police often employ tear gas. Eighty-five nations, including all of the major military and industrial nations of the world except the United States, are now parties to the protocol. Geoffrey, (1980:65) maintains that in November 1969, President Nixon announced that the administration asked the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to the ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. In submitting the protocol to the Senate, he stated: " the United States renounced any use of bacteriological and toxic weapons, would confine its bacteriological and toxic programs to research for defensive purposes, and would seek further agreement on effective arms-control measures in the field of bacteriological and chemical warfare. Like other major powers, the United States would reserve the right to use prohibited chemical (but not bacteriological) weapons in retaliation against any enemy state failing to observe the prohibitions of the protocol". The U.S understanding of the protocol was that it does not prohibit 'riot-control agents' (such irritant gases as tear gas) or 'chemical herbicides' (such as the defoliants that had been widely used in Vietnam) However, the U.S Senate has not yet acted on the protocol.

In continuation, the American understanding of the meaning of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 runs counter to that expressed in a UN General Assembly resolution of December 16, 1969, which stated that any chemical agent of warfare toxic to man, animals, or plants was prohibited by the protocol and by general international law, even in the absence of the treaty. Clifford, (2009:117) holds that, despite the fact, that the resolution was adopted by 80 votes to three, the 36 abstentions (including many important NATO states) considerably weakened its force.

Total Protection from Chemical or Biological Attack

Total protection from chemical, biological or bacteriological attack is difficult, but steps can be taken to reduce the effects. Philippe, (1999:41) provides four approaches to such protection which include: early detection of chemical, biological or bacteriological agents,

physical shelter from the agents, decontamination of exposed materials and clothing and appropriate medical treatments.

Detection and Shelter

Since many chemical, biological and bacteriological agents are colorless, odorless, and tasteless, an attack could take place without the victims realizing it in any civil war. However, if chemical detection devices were situated in an area of attack, they could signal that a dangerous chemical was present. Jimmy, (2007:18) opines that the military can use chemical detection equipment in combat areas and is developing detection kits for soldiers. Detection kits might contain treated paper or liquids that change color when certain chemical agents are present. Generally, confirming the presence of a biological agent is more difficult. Even if a biological attack were known to be occurring, quick identification of the offending organism could be problematic in both international and non international armed conflicts. Hence, Stephenson, (2009:86) posits that the U.S. military has developed a field apparatus that can test an air sample for the presence of specific biological agents, otherwise referred to as "Biological Integrated Detection System" (BIDS) It can confirm the presence of a handful of microorganisms, including anthrax and plague bacteria. However, there are scores of possible biological agents that cannot be easily detected especially in an international armed conflict. Again, several efforts are being made to develop a generic detector of dangerous organisms, using techniques like laser technology and mass spectrometry. Despite such efforts, the ability to rapidly identify all possible warfare agents in the field remains elusive. (Ogunjobi, 2009:103) Once chemical, biological or bacteriological agents are detected, a sealed, ventilated shelter can provide protection. Preventing agents from entering the lungs and protective outer garments keep toxic agents from touching bare skin.

Decontamination and Treatment

Quick decontamination of exposed surfaces is possible for most chemical, biological and bacteriological agents. Bleach, special powders, or just soap and water can neutralize some chemical and most biological agents. A few agents, like anthrax spores, may not be easily destroyed if located in deep cracks or other inaccessible places. Glahn, (1997:38) emphasizes that medical or drug treatment can help some victims of chemical and biological weapons. Bleaching powder can lessen skin injuries from mustard exposure, if applied soon after contact. Also, Atropine and other antidotes can neutralize the effects of nerve agents. Since nerve agents can kill in minutes, the antidotes must be injected almost immediately after exposure especially in a very tough battlefield. A pre-treatment drug called pyridostigmine bromide may help prevent the effects of certain nerve agents in any armed conflicts, although studies suggest the drug may have unwanted side effects. Equally, vaccinations can protect against some biological agents, such as anthrax, and some are susceptible to antibiotics. Adeleye, (2006:92) affirms that in diseases that can be treated by antibiotics, therapy must begin promptly, to be effective against plague bacteria, antibiotics must be given within 24 hours after exposure.

The Law as It Relates To Weapons

Explosive bullets: The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration prohibits the use of any projectile weighing less than 400g and which is either explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable substances. The Declaration states that such projectiles “would uselessly aggravate the suffering of disabled men or render their death inevitable”. Okonta, (2005:93) claims that it outlaws so-called “exploding” bullets which detonate on impact with the human body. This treaty is an early expression of the new customary rule prohibiting the use of weapons causing superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. Since then, technological developments have changed State practice. Bowett, (1964:53) provides that the exploding bullets weighing less than 400g are regularly used against material and other hard surface objects. However, the prohibition on the use of bullets which explode upon impact with the human body remains valid. The object and purpose of the St. Petersburg Declaration and the prohibition on the use of weapons causing injury or suffering beyond what is required to take a soldier out of action are important elements of the law armed conflict.

Expanding Bullets: The Hague Declaration of 1899 banned the use of expanding bullets, which are also commonly known as “**dumdum**” bullets. In the words of Pedro, (2008:17) these are bullets that expand or flatten easily in the human body, causing massive and often fatal wounds. Examples are bullets with a hard outer covering which do not entirely cover the softer lead core or bullets that have incisions across the tip.

Poison: Customary law bans the use of poison during armed conflicts, the poisoning of arrow tips or spear being good examples, and The Hague Regulations of 1899 and subsequently those of 1907 made the ban a part of treaty law.

Certain Conventional Weapons: 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects on human body. The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, often referred to as CCW, is a cornerstone in the regulation of conventional weapons. Wippman and Evangelista (1999:29) argue that it governs weapons which may have indiscriminate effects or cause unnecessary injury. In an attempt to limit the suffering of both civilians and combatants in armed conflict, it prohibits certain types of weapons while strictly regulating others. The Conventional Weapons Convention is sometimes referred to as a framework onto which individual protocols on specific weapons can be added as and when required. As at 1 May 2001, there were four protocols to the CCW. For absolute comprehension of the subject matter, we shall look into the weapons which these Protocols cover. Protocol I- Non- Detectable Fragments: It is prohibited to use any weapon the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments which cannot be detected by X-rays. Protocol I is aimed at weapons like grenades that are made of plastic or similar material that does not show up on X-rays and that would therefore be extremely difficult to locate and remove surgically. Glahn, (1997:46) provides that the protocol is an application of the principle prohibiting weapons causing superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. Such weapons not

only put combatants out of action, they hinder treatment and recovery. There is no military justification for that. Protocol II – Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices: Protocol II applies to both international and non-international armed conflicts. The rules presented here are from the amended version of that instrument. Let us see how these various weapons are defined. Mines: A Mine is a munition placed under, on or near the ground and designed to be exploded by the presence of proximity to or contact with a person or vehicle. According to Grabber, (1949:34) there are two main types of mines: anti-tank mines, now also commonly referred to as anti-vehicle mines, and anti-personnel mines. Anti-vehicle mines are designed to destroy or disable vehicles or tanks. Anti-personnel mines, on the other hand, are designed to incapacitate, injure or kill people. The main feature of both types is that they are victim – activated. Booby Traps: These are devices or materials which are designed, constructed or adapted to kill or injure and which function unexpectedly, when a person disturbs or approaches as apparently harmless object or carries out an apparently safe act (such as opening a letter or door, entering or driving a vehicle), i.e. they are deliberately disguised in or as harmless objects or involve that would seem to be a safe act.

Other Devices: By this we mean devices and munitions placed manually which are designed to kill, injure or damage when they are set off. Bordwell, (1988:73) opines that they can be activated by hand (by lighting a fuse, by remote control when attached to a long wire and electrically detonated, or by transmitter). They can also be set off automatically if a timing mechanism is attached to the device. Remotely delivered Mines: In the words of Schindler and Toman, (1988:64) these are mines delivered by artillery, missile, rocket or mortar, or dropped from an aircraft. They can be anti-tank or anti-personnel mines. For purposes of the CCW, mines delivered from a land –based system from less than 500 meters are not considered to be remotely delivered.

Protection of United Nations Forces and Humanitarian Organizations from the Effects of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices

Protocol II (as amended) requires that the parties to a conflict protect the following from the effects of mines, booby traps and other devices.

- United Nations peacekeeping forces or observer missions;
- any of the following if they have the consent of the country in whose territory they are operating:
 - missions operating under the Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;
 - United Nations humanitarian or fact- finding missions;
 - missions of the International Committee of the Red Cross or National Red cross or Red Crescent Societies, their international Federation or similar humanitarian missions;
 - any mission of an impartial humanitarian organization;
 - Fact - finding missions established pursuant to the 1949 Geneva Conventions or their Additional Protocols.

Meyrowitz, (1990:15) affirms that the degree of protection will depend on the circumstances and the tactical situation, but generally field commanders at all levels, liaison officers who might be briefing these organizations will need to bear in mind that, if so requested by the head of a force or humanitarian mission, they are obliged to take measures to protect these

missions from the effects of mines, booby traps and other devices. This includes the clearance of these munitions or at least of lanes or routes so as to permit safe passage.

The 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti – personnel Mines and on their Destruction (the Ottawa treaty)

The Ottawa treaty is considered by many to be landmark convention aimed at eliminating, once and for all, the suffering and casualties caused by anti – personnel mines. States which are party to the treaty, undertake never under any circumstances, including both international and non-international armed conflicts:

- to use anti – personnel landmines;
- to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer anti – personnel landmines, directly or indirectly;
- to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited by the convention.

These are comprehensive prohibitions aimed at eliminating all use of anti – personnel mines. Kwakwa, (1992:29) contends that they forbid both direct and indirect involvement in any of the activities listed above. For example, they prohibit a State to which the treaty applies from transporting anti – personnel mines on behalf of a coalition partner which is not bound by the treaty. They also prohibit participation in planning to use the weapons in joint operations even if the actual use is by a non-party State, or any other similar assistance.

States must also:

- destroy or ensure the destruction of all their stockpiles of anti-personnel mines;
- clear mined areas under their jurisdiction or control;
- if in a position to do so, provide assistance for mine victims, for mine clearance and for stockpile destruction.

Under the Ottawa treaty, anti-personnel mine means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. The treaty therefore prohibits, explosive devices constructed, altered or adapted to function as anti-personnel mines. According to Bowett, (1964:22):

States are allowed to keep a limited number of anti-personnel mines specifically for the development of and training in mine- detection or mine-clearance techniques.

The number must, however, not exceed the minimum necessary, which is generally understood to mean no more than several thousand. Many States have decided not to retain any anti-personnel landmines for this purpose.

CONCLUSION

It is an indisputable fact that the International Humanitarian Law has certainly intervened in the present day armed conflicts to regulate use of weapons. These weapons, especially chemical, biological, and bacteriological weapons are not only injurious to human health but also offensively disastrous to the socio-economic and political interests of Nation-States. Buscuttil, (1998:46) affirms that the United Nations has equally spelt out certain rules that would govern some weapons (both conventional and non-conventional) especially in accordance with the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of asphyxiating, poisonous,

or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare decision, the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Test in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, the 1971 Treaty on Prohibition of replacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, to mention but a few.

Consequent upon this, the issue of weapons as regards its production application and regulation, is still a subject of inexplicable controversy among member nations of UNO and some other major players who operate at the center stage of world politics. Hence, the United Nations should intensify its effort to restructure, re-organize and re-strengthen its position on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus, health is wealth and man is really a man only when man is deeply protected of dangerous weapons in this 21st century.

REFERENCES

- Ajala J. and Sagay, P. (1998) *Laws of Armed Conflicts*, London: Oxford University Press.
- Adeleye, O.N. (2006) *Evolution of International Politics*. Ibadan: University Press.
- Bailey, Sydney, (1972) *Prohibitions and Restraints in War*, London: Oxford University Press.
- Best-Geoffrey, (1980) *Humanity in Warfare: The modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflicts*, London: Oxford University Press.
- Sands, Philippe (eds.) (1999) *International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons*, Cambridge University Press.
- Bordwell, Percy (1988) *The Law Of War between Belligerents: A History and Commentary*, Chicago: Chicago Press.
- Bowett, Derek W (1964) *United Nations Forces: A Legal Study of United Nations Practice*, Stevens London.
- Burton & Tillet (1991) *Wars and Conflict in International Relations*. New York: New York Press
- Buscuttil, Jam Dordrecht J. (1998) *Naval Weapons Systems and the Contemporary law of War*, London: Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- Clement, A.A. (2008) *Strategic Nuclear Weapons*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Clifford, C.P. (2009) *Military Development and Civil Wars in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
- D. Schindler and J. Toman (1988) *The Laws of Armed Conflicts*, London: Martinus Nihjoff Publishers

- D. Wippman and M. Evangelista (eds.) (1999) *New Wars, New Laws: Applying the Laws of War in 21st Century Conflicts*, New York: New York Press
- Fessler, E. Anthony (1989) *Directed-energy Weapons: A Juridical Analysis*, New York; Praeger.
- Glahn Gerhard Von, (1957) *The occupation of enemy territory: a commentary on the law and practice of belligerent occupation*, Mine Apolis: University of Minnesota Press
- Grabber, Doris Appel (1999) *The Development of the Law of Belligerent Occupation 1863-1914: A historical survey*, New York: Columbia University Press,
- Jimmy, P.O.P. (2007) *Preventable Armed Conflicts*. Nairobi: Eschellon Publishers
- Kwakwa, Edward (1992) *The International law of Armed Conflict: Personal and Material Fields of Application*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers
- Meyrowitz, Elliott (1990) *Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: The relevance of International law*, New York: Transnational Publishers, Dobbs Ferry.
- Ogunjobi, C.C. (2009) *Development of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Europe*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Okolo, O. (2007) *Chemical Weapons in Action*. Abuja: Universal Publishers
- Pedro, A.Y. (2008) *Development of Nuclear Weapons in Middle East*. Moscow: Javel Press.
- Philippe, D.J. (1999) *Contemporary Armed Conflicts in the Globe*. New York: Chimzy Establishments.
- Pogany, Van (ed.) (1987) *Nuclear Weapons and International law* Hampshire: Amesbury, Alders hot.
- Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare decision*", (1999) Geneva: ICRC Press.
- Smith, Y. (2005) *Strategic Development in Nuclear Age*. Chicago: Harrington Publishers
- Stephenson, C.C.N. (2009) *Methods of Warfare*. Chicago: Harfords Investment.
- The 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Test in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water*", Geneva: ICRC Press.
- The 1971 Treaty on Prohibition of replacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof*, Geneva: ICRC Press.

The 1971 Treaty on Prohibition of Replacement of Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea bed and the Ocean floor and in the Subsoil thereof Geneva: ICRC Press

The 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and their Destruction Geneva: ICRC Press.

The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration

The Hague Declaration of 1899

1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects.