

**UNDERSCORING THE IMPORTANCE OF INTER-AGENCY
COOPERATION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST BOKO HARAM:
REVEALING THE GAINS OF NIGERIAN ARMY-POLICE
COLLABORATION, 1999-2015**

Chilaka, Francis Chigozie, & Idika Ikechukwu

Department of Political Science, Federal University, Otuoke, Bayelsa State

*Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria Nsukka, Enugu
State*

Email: chilakafc@fuotuoke.edu.ng, wariykee@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

The paper is geared towards making a case for inter-agency cooperation especially between the Nigerian army and police in the fight against terrorism. It also elucidates on failed efforts made by the government to eliminate Boko Haram activities which has made it expedient for the collaboration of the Nigerian Army and Police in the containment exercise. Using the collective security theory, the paper argues that Nigerian Army-Police cooperation is essential in the fight against Boko Haram, as it eliminated duplication of function, possible fratricide, bureaucratic bottlenecks, while it enthroned intelligence sharing, and the pooling of resources, but was not devoid of tension. Despite this, the paper maintains that collaboration is essential hence, recommends that para-military and military training should be done together, before they move to their fields of specialization. After learning the rudiments of security and receiving the same drills, for a couple of months, the trainees can now be transferred to various agencies' training schools. This will create the bond needed for interagency cooperation.

Keywords: Army, Police, Containment, Boko Haram, Inter-Agency, Cooperation

INTRODUCTION

The Nigerian Police (NP) is charged with the responsibility of maintaining law and order within the territorial jurisdiction of the country; as well as ensuring the detection and prevention of crime, as enshrined in the Police Act and section 214 of the 2011 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) as amended. However, due to the nature of the activities of the insurgent group, Boko Haram and their inability to contain the wide spread attack of July, 2009: the military were deployed to complement and enhance their efforts. The continued attacks by the insurgent group and the inability of the NP to solely curb the development, led to the formation of the Joint Task Force (JTF) by the federal government, initially comprising of the Army and Police, but later enlarged to include the Department of State Services (DSS), Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), the Air Force, and the Nigerian Navy. In this loose arrangement, the Army took the lead in operations, with other agencies lending a complementary hand in dealing with the situation. The creation of the task force was to allow resources to be pooled, to prevent the duplication of function and to allow the free flow of information among the different security agencies. The military's involvement is also predicated on the sect's violation of the territorial jurisdiction of the country. However, the Army-Police relations have always been ridden with antagonism, as each tries to prove seniority or superiority to the other. The Nigeria Police believes that the Army was created out of it, hence should be under them, while the army on the other hand believes that they are more superior to the Police given the nature of the training they receive. The long military rule in the country also contributed to the strife between the two agencies; as the Police are said to have been marginalized

during this period. Consequently, the Police see the civilian rule as an opportunity to regain its lost glory in the Polity. This competitive relationship by omission or commission negatively affect security in the country. There is no doubt that insurgent groups like Boko Haram may leverage from this. The socio-economic and political effects of Boko Haram activities in the polity cannot be over emphasized. Socially, the sect's activities have displaced thousands and further engendered the ethnic, cultural and religious disparity in the country. In Maiduguri, where the sect originated, the frequent bombings and clashes between the Boko Haram and security agents have weighed down seriously on commercial and business activities in the city as many businesses have reportedly crumbled, while many people fled the state. The Maiduguri market said to be the biggest in the city is reported to have been seriously affected as hundreds of shops owners, especially southerners are said to have closed business and left the troubled city. About half of the 10,000 shops and stalls in the market were said to have been abandoned by traders who fled the city (Ezeani & Chilaka, 2013). Similarly, the sect's activities affected the FDI inflow into the country.

Nigerian economy lost N1.33 trillion Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) owing to problem of insecurity; as the revenue to Nigeria fell to \$ 6.1 billion (N 933.3billion) in 2010, with close to a 30% fall from the \$8.65 billion (N1.33 trillion) in 2009 (Ezeani & Chilaka, 2013: 51).

In addition, Gillespie (2014) contends that one of the effects of Boko Haram was the immediate drop of Foreign Direct

Investment (FDI), adding that FDI inflow to Nigeria dropped to 21% in just one year- from \$8.9 billion in 2011 to \$7 billion in 2012. In this kind of situation, one expected this essential synergy between the two agencies as no one of them could contain it alone without the other, rather the rate at which the Boko Haram activities flourished shows that all is not well with the relations. Nevertheless, the paper shall argue that inter-agency collaboration must be encouraged despite squabbles arising from it. Hence, the need for synergy between the Nigerian Army and Police is the focal point of this paper; to determine its necessity for the fight against terrorism by laying bare empirical evidence that should sustain the collaboration. To this end, the objective of the paper is to buttress that Nigerian Army-Police collaboration is essential in the fight against terrorism.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

One theory behind the fight against terrorism is Collective Security. Collective security is a system of maintaining peace and security by the concerned action and agreement of all (Barry, 1996:82). It aims at establishing a mutual responsibility and pooling the resources of all in an effort to maintaining peace and security. Thus, the maintenance of the *status qua* becomes a community project instead of a unilateral or bilateral plan of action (Chilaka & Odoh, 2015:2). In fact,

The practice of collective security requires all nations to join one universal alliance...When associated in this manner, each nation adjust its individual interests in favour of the group interests. When power is shared in an all-for-one and one-for-all alliance, the military and diplomatic resources of the entire group may

be activated to police the misbehaving aggressor. The principle enjoins all nations to use and form a common front in fighting a perceived aggressor that threatens the security of any state or states (Asogwa, 1999:88).

Collective security is based on four basic tenets. First, all forswear the use of force except in self-defense. Second, all agree that the peace is indivisible. An attack on one is an attack on all. Third, all pledge to unite to halt aggression and restore the peace and all agree to supply whatever material or personnel resources necessary to form a collective security force to defeat aggressors and restore the peace. Collective security therefore seeks to confront would be aggressors with the concerted power of all determined to keep the peace. It involves the commitment to demonstrate to aggressor that crime does not pay. According to Palmer and Perkins (2004) the concept of collective security entail a machinery for joint action in order to prevent or counter any attack against an established order. In short, it implies collective measures for dealing with threats to peace. It there for implies that mankind should pursue a common course to maintain and enforce international peace and security (Asogwa, 1999). Collective security is a theory of international relations but has been domesticated as a result of terrorism. For instance, despite the fact that many terrorist attacks happened outside the US, the US government still take it as a responsibility to assist countries that are victims of terrorism to counter it. With this in mind, terrorism in Nigeria should as well be seen as a collective responsibility between the various security agencies in Nigeria. Nigeria cannot be begging developed countries such as the US,

Britain, Germany, China, France among others to assist her to fight insurgency while her security agencies work in disarray. The cooperation of security agencies in Nigeria is a sine qua non in the fight against insurgency, this is more so because the fight against terrorism has become a collective effort and should be prosecuted collectively. In international politics, the fight against terrorism has united countries of the world, one should not expect less from agencies tasked to confront it within Nigeria. Scholarly evidence, has shown that terrorism is now considered as an international phenomenon with an international effort to curb it. Nigerian security agencies should collectively assist other countries who are willing to render help to Nigeria in order to fight insurgency. The fight against of Boko Haram by the Nigerian army would be futile without the collective cooperation of National Intelligence Agency, Nigerian Customs, Immigration, Civil Defence, and Directorate of Security Services and more importantly the police.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

Interagency Relationship: This is the cordial working cooperation that exists between or among agencies. This relationship could be that of cooperation or one of feud. While cordial interagency relationships could enhance the containment strategies of combating terrorism in Nigeria, interagency feud or rivalry could scuttle the containment process. Kaiser (2011) while writing on interagency collaborative arrangements and activities identified five (5) types of relationships that exist between and among agencies as: Collaboration, Coordination, Merger, Integration and Network. Collaboration as identified is an arrangement which relies to a substantial degree on voluntary or discretionary

participation among members; who are relatively equal or at parity in a venture. Furthermore, collaboration recognizes a certain degree of voluntarism among participants; here, the level of input by individual/agency differs, based on their determination and not on directives from the lead agency. Under this kind of arrangement, there will be some degree of management by objective. On coordination, he described it as a situation where an officer or agency takes charge or leads an operation, directing one or other agencies. Merger entails the coming together, or transfer of all or part of different agencies or their authorities, functions or jurisdiction, personnel and resources to another on a permanent basis. In such a situation, it is either a new entity is formed or an already existing one is strengthened to operate. Kaiser argued that integration as a loose arrangement brings relevant agencies together, either on a permanent or adhoc basis, to the achievement of a particular goal. In conclusion, he identified network as the connectivity or sharing of intelligence or ideas making relationship between agencies streamlined.

Nigerian Army-Police Relations: The Gains in the Fight against of Boko Haram

A review of the responsibility of the different agencies show that they have interwoven responsibilities, the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), monitors issues of national security from outside the shores of the country; the Department of State Services (DSS) gathers intelligence from within; while the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) gathers military related intelligence. Also in the national security responsibility, the Nigerian Police is tasked with the responsibility of detection and prevention of crime; Nigerian

Custom charged with preventing the inflow of banned goods, illegal arms, and ammunition across our border post; the immigration whose responsibility is to ensure that suspected terrorist do not cross the borders or leave same. The prison is mandated to ensure that arrested terrorist remain in the prison facility (Adeniyi, 2012). Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) monitor the petroleum pipe lines and marked vehicle against being rigged with explosives respectively. Furthermore, the Military ensures the annihilation of external aggression and assisting in maintaining internal peace when called upon to do so; the Army that takes care of aggression from the land, the Navy from the territorial waters and the Air Force from the air. The obtained pieces of information are pieced to make intelligence and passed to appropriate authority for execution. The foregoing makes interagency collaboration imperative for effective containment of Boko Haram activities in the country, as it eliminates duplication of functions, encourages intelligence sharing and reduces waste. Also, their functions are interconnected to the other, and the success of one leads to the elimination of a potential threat. It was the proactive intelligence from the NIA/DSS that led to the early arrest of Mohammed Yusuf, Bello Maiduga and Ore Ashafa in 2002 on their return from radical training in Afganistian, Lebanon, Pakistian, and Iraq. If not for the politics of ethnicity, and religion they would not have been released to cause mayhem in the polity. As during interrogation, they volunteered confession that they had been trained in terrorism in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Iraq. Items recovered from them during the raid include, maps, and diagrams of governmental agencies, establishments and some specific buildings in Abuja (*News Watch* August 7,

2009). They provided the first link between the fundamentalist group and Al-Qaeda terrorist group (Ekwugum, 2011). They were remanded in prison custody, but following the exit of President Olusegun Obasanjo, the trio were released. The Army are more often than not confined to the barracks, with limited contact with the civilian population; most of these barracks are located in isolated places, with all the facilities-market, mammy, hospital and sporting facilities situated therein. This isolated life style and non-involvement in the settlement of civil cases, absolves them of the necessary knowledge of the area, as well as intelligence of criminal elements. In addition, the soldiers that were deployed to quell the insurrection in the north-eastern states were drawn from different divisions ranging from 1st division, Kaduna; 2nd division, Ibadan, Oyo state; and 3rd armoured division with headquarters in Jos, Plateau state. Others were 81 division located in Lagos, and 82 divisions in Enugu: before the establishment of 7th division Maiduguri, Borno State in 2013. On the contrary, the NP resides within civilian populace, buys and trades with the residents of the area. This gives them knowledge of the area, as well as avails them of intelligence on suspected and confirmed fundamentalist. Furthermore, criminal profiling and their daily duty in the office avails them of knowledge of the environment, as reported cases of crime and handling of civil cases, makes them grounded on details of dissident elements in the society. The disparity in their duties and amount of Police's knowledge of the environment calls for collaboration between the duo during operations. This can be seen in the manner and ease at which the Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf was arrested by the combined team of the Army and Police in the coordinated cordon and search operations that covered

Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Yobe, Kaduna, Niger and Adamawa states. The Police in that operation, radioed all their stations across the states and LGAs, and they were all on red alert "sniffing" through the areas where Yusuf was once sighted, when eventually the search was narrowed to Borno state, the Army were called in; the proficiency and prowess through force exerted by the Army, and the knowledge of the environment as possessed by the Police led to his arrest. Even after the Police were accused of having killed Yusuf in custody, it was also the action and synergy between the duo that led to the quelling of the revolt by the followers of Yusuf. However, trust became an issue, after the duo traded blames on the status of Yusuf's death. The cooperation would have led to the early annihilation of the Boko Haram terrorist group; if the duo had further trusted each other, and not worked to undermine each other in their subsequent operations. Most times, what leads to working in disparity is the need for recognition, and the desire to be applauded by their hierarchy. Collaboration between the Nigerian army and Police also avails the agencies different sides or knowledge of dealing with issues that would be brought to the bare in the course of operational (ops) planning and execution. It is pertinent to note that these agencies have different training, rules of engagement, prowess, expertise; and the individuals involved in the containment exercise had participated in different operations, and foreign missions. The knowledge acquired in the course of these operations would have helped in tackling issues from different and unified vantage position, and prism; which would have led to operations advancement and development, as well as early and complete containment of the activities of the terrorist group. This sharing of operational idea would also help improve the expertise of

personnel, both in the Police and Army. The strategy used in the joint operation of June 30, 2013 in Borno State was not the normal Police method of advance-confrontational strategy. In the said operation, the Boko Haram sect were expecting an aerial bombardment arising from the earlier attacks, rather, the joint operations briefing resulted to ground attacks that killed over forty (40) Boko Haram members in Zabarmari, Jere LGA, Borno on 30th June, 2013 (<http://pointblanknews.com/pbn/exclusive/jtf-kills-40-boko-haram-members>)

The military men deployed to the area were not adequate to effectively fight Boko Haram activities, making Police collaboration of great imperative. The Police have the strength when it comes to personnel in the Boko Haram ridden areas, as they have outposts and divisions in all the LGAs in the state; while the Army has limited personnel and weaponry concentrated in a place unlike the Police to face the insurgents. The synergy between these two agencies led to an increase in personnel and weapons, to face the terrorist as terrorism demands concerted alliance to curb. This inadequate personnel was captured by Andrew Noakes (the coordinator of Nigerian Security Network Research group which investigates insecurity in Nigeria) in Stein, (2012), he reveals that to carry out a counter insurgency campaign, Nigeria needs about 200,000 soldiers to the north eastern states, he estimated that there were about 30,000 to 40,000 troops battling Boko Haram. On police solo operation, their pusillanimous and compromising nature, familiarity with the civilian and corrupt nature breeds contempt, and dismay before the eyes of the citizen. This gap would have been bridged with their collaboration with the Army in an insurgent

environment, as the army while in operation in Nigeria, sends chill of fear to its adversaries. Furthermore, the average civilian has trust issues with the Nigeria Police, so obtaining actionable information from them would be difficult without the knowledge that they are collaborating with the Army. Furthermore, given the vastness of the area to be covered-north-eastern states, each of the agencies solo operation is futility in advance. The fall of Gwoza was a critical example of lack of synergy, the Army were initially proposed to aid in guarding the Mobile Police facility as they do to DSS facilities in Kano, and Borno States: Ahmed Musa (Col) said the inferiority complex of the Police caused them to kick against the move. Consequently, on 8th August, 2014 the attack on the Police facility gave the terrorist group advantage in weaponry to strike in other parts of Gwoza, causing the military to flee Gwoza and subsequent capture and declaration of Islamic Caliphate therein by the Boko Haram sect.(<http://saharareporters.com/2004/08/08/nigeria-troops-flee-gwoza-boko-haram-capturedtanksand-drivers-commander-whereabout-unknown>). In a society devoid of interagency collaboration, policy making and implementation are likely to be fragmented and divided among agencies with overlapping jurisdictions and shared responsibilities. Feasible conditions could be uncertain over future roles and responsibilities of individual agencies, lack of a clear and common direction, or an ignorance of other agency's responsibilities or activities in same realm (Kaiser, 2011). When agencies are operating alone towards the containment of terrorism, they might be saddled with contradictory and overlapping roles; this might lead to unhealthy competition and possible fratricide in the line of duty. Cases abound where Boko Haram members wore Army or Police uniform to attack

an area: working at dissimilitude might lead to mistaken identity, where different agencies would mistake each for Boko Haram members, and cross fire might ensue. One of the responsibilities of the Police in an insurgent environment is to reoccupy an area; and ensure the maintenance of law and order after an onslaught or dislodgement of terror group in the area. This arrangement is to ensure that the terrorists do not return in the dislodged area. According to a respondent from the Nigerian Army Bello R. (Major/Maiduguri), he alleges that the Police do not perform this function as required, leading to their being involved in the duty in an insurgent environment. This duty if well performed would have assisted the Army to concentrate completely on the onslaught, and not waste personnel carrying out Police duties.

Solomon (2012:10) whilst writing on interagency relationships in Boko Haram ridden environment revealed that "the creation of JTF was at least theoretically; to allow resources to be pooled, to prevent duplication and allow the free flow of information between the different parts of the security services". Intelligence sharing is very imperative in order to curb Boko Haram, the duo needed to cooperate in order to share actionable intelligence that would have led to the containment of Boko Haram, in Nigeria. Corollary to the above is the enhancement in the productivity of agencies; as working together will avail other agencies of different ways of conducting operations. Working in isolation, sole agencies will not be aware of its inadequacies in implementing policies, let alone learn contemporary methods of containing terrorism. In displaced camps, the Police were supposed to infiltrate the camps, provide security and ensure law and orders during the distribution of relief materials. This function as performed by

the Police complements the effort of the Army in the fight against the Boko Haram, as the information so generated during the camp infiltration, is passed to the Military for further action. The Army and Police are formal social control agencies created by the state to ensure that her internal and external security is guaranteed (Odoma & Aderinto, 2012). It was the provision of proactive intelligence that led to the following successes; October 16, 2012 JTF kills twenty four (24) Boko Haram members in different parts of Maiduguri; the military, Police and DSS joint operation on Uregi mountains, Raffi LGA of Niger state in 2013 that uprooted the sect from Niger state; June 30, 2013 JTF kills forty (40) Boko Haram members in Zabarmari Ward, Jere LGA of Borno state; Army and Police raid in Bama town on December 31, 2013 killing sixty three (63) Boko Haram members; JTF killing of forty (40) Boko Haram members in Damba-Gwoza road, Borno state on November 3, 2013, and many more. The recapture of Bama in September 7, 2014, and Gwoza on 27th March, 2015 is another case of victory to collaboration (<http://thisdaylive.com/article/atleast-military-liberates-gwoza-boko-haram-headquarters/205253>). Furthermore, the recapture of Mubi town in Adamawa from Boko Haram on 13th November, 2014 (<http://bbc.com/news/world-africa-30043867>) and Chibok town in Adamawa state on 16th November, 2014 (<http://bbc.com/news/world-africa-3-world-africa-30073702>) are other cases of triumph of resources pool- personnel, weaponry and expertise- and intelligence sharing over terrorism. Obiagwu (2013) contends that one of the murderers of efficiency, effectiveness and productivity is obdurate adherence to bureaucracy, even when the prevailing circumstance calls for urgent action. This situation is eliminated in the event of a joint operation i.e. JTF; as

designated personnel for joint operation do not engage in other official duties, or need approval from office top hierarchy before they engage in operation when the need arises. More so theoretically, these agencies are meant to be together in same camp, this annihilates unnecessary bureaucracy in the containment of Boko Haram. On logistics, the bureaucracy in offices; as it relates to release of vehicles, fuelling, and locating drivers could also hinder success. Such impediments are eliminated in the course of joint operations, as all they do is wait for operational call. Adeniyi (2012:6) while describing the need for interagency collaboration contends that,

Today, our nation is faced with a situation almost akin to war, where dusk to dawn curfew had been in place in some northern states for more than a year, and where the task of maintaining internal security, peace, and order, is now being carried out by the military with troops and armoured vehicles patrolling the streets of major cities across the country. In times such as this, it is the level of cooperation or collaboration among these agencies that determines the degree of security of lives and property in our nation, or indeed in any nation for that matter.

From the above findings, we can see that inter-agency collaboration especially between the Nigerian Army and police is essential in the fight against terrorism despite some challenges that may arise from it. The table below shows the methodological strength and the verifiability of the issue under interrogation.

Hypothesis	Major Variables	Empirical Indicators	Sources of Data	Method of data Collection and Analysis
The Nigerian army & Police cooperation is essential in the fight against Boko Haram	Independent variable (X) the Nigerian army & police cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Intelligence sharing & joint operation that led to the arrest of Mohammed Yusuf, Bello Maiduga and Ore Ashafa in 2002 on their return from radical training in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Iraq. -Harnessing ideas & avoiding duplication of function by working together at NFPT level created in 2007, but became operational in 20012. -coordinated operation between the two that led to the arrest of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009 -The duo's pooling of resources- personnel, weaponry, expertise in JTF created in 2009, that led to the following successes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -October 16, 2012 JTF kills 24 Boko Haram members in different parts of Maiduguri -June 30, 2013 JTF kills 40 Boko Haram 	Secondary sources of Textbook, journals magazine, newspaper, conference & seminar papers. others are institutional documents, Internet materials & interview	<p>Observation of secondary sources of data such as books, journals government documents as well as interview administered on some military and police officers.</p> <p>Collective Security theory; Qualitative descriptive analysis and logical inference</p>

		<p>members in Zabarmari Ward, Jere LGA of Borno state.</p> <p>-JTF kills 40 Boko Haram members in Damba-Gwoza road, Borno state on November 3, 2013.</p> <p>-The military, Police and DSS joint operation at Uregi mountains, Raffi LGA of Niger state in 2013.</p>		
	<p>Dependent variable (Y) fight against the Boko Haram</p>	<p>The capture and killing of Boko Haram founder, Mohammed Yusuf in 2009.</p> <p>-October 16, 2012, 24 sect members killed in different parts of Maiduguri.</p> <p>-June 30, 2013 JTF annihilated 40 Boko Haram members in Zabarmari, Jere LGA, Borno state.</p> <p>-Danba-Gwoza road, 40 Boko Haram members killed by the JTF on November 3, 2013.</p> <p>-JTF killing of five Boko Haram members at Hotoro Dan'marke & Brigade Quarters, Kano state on November 9, 2013;</p> <p>-63 sect members</p>	<p>Secondary sources of Textbook, journals magazine, newspaper, conference & seminar papers. others are institutional documents, Internet materials & interview</p>	<p>Observation of secondary sources of data such as books, journals government documents as well as interview administered on some military and police officers.</p> <p>Collective Security theory; Qualitative descriptive analysis and logical inference</p>

		<p>killed by the army in Bama town, Borno state on December 31, 2013.</p> <p>-March 14, 2014, 207 Boko Haram militants killed by the army in Maiduguri.</p> <p>-November 1, 2014 the killing and beheading of 41 Boko Haram members by a combined forces of the military and civilian JTF in Borno state.</p> <p>-Over 300 members of Boko Haram killed in Bazza, Michika town, Adamawa state on July 4, 2014.</p>		
--	--	--	--	--

Designed by the authors

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The problem caused by Boko Haram terrorist group is obvious. Its attacks have left in its trail woes of destruction of lives and property. The failure of the civil security agencies like the Police to contain the situation, led to the deployment of the Army to complement their efforts, more so that the territorial jurisdiction of Nigeria was under threat. The Police on the other hand did not welcome the development with open arms, as they saw the military as usurper of function. The military on the other hand, looked at the Police with utmost scepticism arising from long history of hostility, corruption and compromise. Consequently, the expected synergy that should have assisted in the elimination of the terror group

was annihilated even before the process started. Despite this, the cooperation led to the duo's pooling of resources—personnel, weaponry, expertise in JTF created in 2009, that led to the following successes: October 16, 2012 JTF kills 24 Boko Haram members in different parts of Maiduguri; June 30, 2013 JTF kills 40 Boko Haram members in Zabarmari Ward, Jere LGA of Borno state; JTF kills 40 Boko Haram members in Damba-Gwoza road, Borno state on November 3, 2013 and the successful military, Police and DSS joint operation at Uregi mountains, Raffi LGA of Niger state in 2013. The above findings reinforced the collective security theory that was used to provide theoretical base for the paper. There is need for all the security agencies to see the Boko Haram insurgency as a collective fight devoid of agency superiority. To achieve more benefits from this collaboration, the paper recommends as follows:

- The Para-military and Military should commence their training together, before they move to their field of specialization. Training together in the sense that the recruitment should be done by a central ministry, after which they move to the same training school, - the Military, Police, NSCDC, NIS, Custom services, and DSS. After learning the rudiments of security and receiving the same drills, for a couple of months, the trainees can now be transferred to various agencies' training schools. This will create the bond needed for interagency cooperation.
- The salary and welfare of these security agencies should be enhanced to eliminate the aggression that comes with the frustration of satisfying one's need. As their present salary is nothing to write home about.

- Discipline is observed to be the guiding principle; the management of these agencies should ensure high level of discipline especially amongst the junior ranks, as they are always at the fore in the line of duty.
- Interagency collaboration can only be effective in an environment where organizational responsibilities are clarified; and modalities for sharing intelligence simplified, other than the existing modalities of going through the National Security Adviser.
- Lectures, seminars, symposia should be regularly organised on the roles and responsibility of the various agencies.
- The agencies should take serious the recruitment process; semi illiterates should not be recruited. The vetting of such new recruits should be done by a central agency, different from the recruiting agency, as practiced in the Military where the DSS takes care of the vetting of new recruits.
- The complementary role of security agencies should be emphasized in training schools and academies; to reduce the competition of supremacy experienced in the field.

REFERENCES

- Adeniyi, O. (2012) "Army, Police, SSS, and the Gunmen". *This day/live.com/article/army/polices and gunmen/13207*.
- Asogwa, F.C., (1999) *Understanding International Relations*. Enugu: Vougasen Ltd.
- Barry, B., (1996) "Collective Security" in I. Mclean (ed.) *Oxford Dictionary of Politics*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.

- Chilaka, F.C. and Odoh, S.I. (2015) "Nigerian Peacekeeping Operations Revisited" *Singaporean Journal of Business, Economics and Management studies*, Vol.4, No.2
- Ekwugun, J. (2011) "Terrorism and Nigerian Development," *The Sun Daily Newspaper Online*, Saturday 24th December.
- Ezeani, E. O & Chilaka, F. C. (2013) "Islamic Fundamentalism and the Problem of Insecurity in Nigeria: The Boko Haram Phenomenon" *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, Vol.15, Issue 3.
- Gillespie, A. (2014) "Boko Haram and the Impact on the Economy", *the African Business Journal*
- Igwe, O. (2007) *Politics and Globe Dictionary*, Enugu: Kenny and Brothers Enterprises.
- Kaiser, F. M. (2011) *Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities: Types, Rational, Considerations*, Washington: Congressional Research Service.
- Obiagwu, L. (2013) "Niger State and Insurgency: Issues and Challenges". Lecture Delivered During the Independence Day Celebration in Minna, Niger State
- Odoma, S. and Aderinto, A. (2013) "Power Consciousness of Security Operatives: The Bane of Inter Agency Feud in Nigeria", *International Journal of Criminology and Sociological Theory*, Vol.6, No.3, p. 12.
- Palmer, N.D., and Perkins, H.C., (2004). *International Relations*, Delhi: A. I. T. B. S. Publishers and Distributors.
- Stien, C. (2015) Why Nigeria's Military is losing the Battle against the Boko Haram

Underscoring the Importance of Inter-Agency Cooperation in the Fight against Boko Haram: Revealing the Gains of Nigerian Army-Police Collaboration, 1999-2015

Chilaka, Francis Chigozie & Idika Ikechukwu

<http://americaalgezera.com/articles/2015/i/131/bokoharamnigeriamilitary.com>. Assessed on 14 April, 2016.

Solomon, E. (2011) "Counter Terrorism in Nigeria". *Wall Street Journal*, January, 23 2012 <http://searchrequest.com/docview/917144164account=4444>. Assessed on 14 April, 2016.

References to this paper should be made as follows: Chilaka, Francis Chigozie & Idika Ikechukwu (2017), *Underscoring the Importance of Inter-Agency Cooperation in the Fight against Boko Haram: Revealing the Gains of Nigerian Army-Police Collaboration, 1999-2015*. *J. of Arts and Contemporary Society*, Vol. 9, No. 4, Pp. 21-42
