

TRANSNATIONAL INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM IN AFRICA: ISSUES AND TASKS FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION

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Abstract

That Africa is beleaguered is non-alarmist. Spiraling-down from Cairo to Cape, the entire region undergoes episodic crippling from the viral presence of insurgencies, xenophobic and terror groups operating with transnational morbidity. With most having questionable grievances, multiple bands of marauders intermixed with sectarians and political renegades; concertedly using asymmetric attacks and marauding tactics; thriving on wide-ranging criminality. They traverse multiple borders to merchandise crude terror, 'acts of pure evil', genocide and displacements; rolling back investments, cowing civilians, confounding national armies and rattling governments. The *failed-state* plague across Africa had predisposed these millennial menaces, setting the continent adrift. The work examines the prevalence of insecurity cropping from transnational insurgency and terrorism and its impact on African economic development and integration. The paper observes, evidentially, the stultifying of African agendas on economic development and integration (including the MDGs), with strained states U-turning from progressive governance to dissipating energies on crises management, and diverting chunk budgetary provisions into combating insecurity. As African States and Union scamper for external interventions, the myth is betrayed, again, of African solutions to African problems. These are not times for negritude. The paper proves that African integration, ab initio, was a ruse and had culminated in this pervasive insecurity. It contends, with suggested solutions, if Africa must develop and retrieve from monumental tragedy independent of the current transnational insurgency, the task is apparently urgent. African leaders and regional integrators must reevaluate, reconceptualise, and re-strategize alongside the issues here-raised. Reasonably, the secrets of effective nation-building, regional integration and developmental futures embed in-house Africa, in committed multiple policy departures, and not in neocolonial interventions.

Keywords: Africa, Insecurity, Insurgency, Terrorism, Economic Development, Regional Integration.

Introduction

It is indubitable that insecurity is inimical and incongruous to human development. It is also currently acknowledged in the civilized world and development-minded societies that insecurity from insurgency and terrorism is a most formidable threat that beset the millennial optimism for human advancements in peace and development. It is much more worrisome in that the operationalism of insurgency and terrorism today, particularly the faith-based ones, is such that it sought frantically to not just wrest and thwart development agendas, but rather poised to actually destroy the modern concept and practice of development in its very self, and to plunge humanity back into the dark ages. Put differently, and since September 11, the millennial dimension to insurgency and terrorism is strangely menacing and nihilistic. The pre-911 Al-Qaida attacks are much different in nature than what currently obtains. Then, destructive acts were committed by aggrieved groups who were often seeking to contest, influence or deepen the process, impact and gains of development in self-interest. But now, insurgency and terrorism, particularly those inspired and franchised by Al-Qaedaism, have preposterously and implacably evolved to imperil humanity, and are directed at the very soul, roots, elements, and growth of civility and development. Their activities, ultimately aimed at the very jugular of civility, are capable of setting human development on a fast reverse-track back into the stark rurality of the Dark Ages.

Quite worrisomely, this form of insurgency and terrorism has found its way into many regions of the world, and in particular, Africa. This is work particularly interested in the fate of Africa as it currently groans under this kind of nihilistic insurgency and terrorism. It has actually gained a foothold across the continent such that it now operates in transnational quantum. This is against the background that Africa currently operates from behind the rest of the developed world. Its vulnerability is immense, considering the level of poverty that ravages the region, its many feeble and failing states, most of whom are also desperately poor, and its difficulty to break the yoke of underdevelopment. It is therefore pertinent to undertake this research to examine the region, vis-à-vis, its pre, and post-colonial experiences, impact of the nihilistic post Al-Qaeda insurgency and terrorism

as it currently pounds the region, as against its quest to gain a foothold in global scheme of trade, and its bid to economically develop and integrate.

Methodology/Scope of Research and Information Sources

Secondary sources of information were carefully selected from recently published journals, books, magazines, internet, newspapers, documentaries, and very importantly, the official publications of relevant governmental and non-governmental organisations. The work has thus adopted the descriptive, narrative, and deductive methods of reasoning, and as well, a theoretical analysis of the secondary literatures. The paper is significant because of its rich insight into the multiple problems of insecurity economic development and integration. It is also historic critical. The scope of this paper shall thus cover the following areas:

1. Introduction.
2. Methodology/scope of research and information sources.
3. Overview of insecurity, transnational insurgency and terrorism in Africa.
4. The predisposing factors for insecurity in Africa: the dimension of transnational insurgency and terrorism.
5. Impact of transnational insurgency and terrorism on African economic development and integration.
6. Issues, tasks and prospects for Africa's' economic development and regional integration
7. Conclusion.

Overview of Insecurity, Transnational Insurgency and Terrorism in Africa

Insecurity is neither strange nor recent to Africa. In fact, and without being derogatory, it has been argued that pre-colonial Africa celebrated insecurity as an industry (Odeyemi, 2014). African history from the pre-colonial era is replete with chaos, anarchy, wars, displacements, forced migrations,¹ enslavements, and all forms of existential threats, all of which had constituted grave danger to human security and advancement on the continent. It is not that insecurity is peculiar to Africa as that was the

¹ The *mfecane* is a major forced migration that lasted through the 1820s in southern Africa. Triggered by multiple factors, it marked a period of heightened turmoil and instability in the region during which kingdoms fell and rose.

experience with virtually every continent, especially from the pre-modern times. What perhaps distinguished other non-African societies is their penchant, after all, to restore, reorganize, and enhance human security and worth, particularly in the aftermath of the waves of Industrial Revolution. Europe, Asia, and America, for instance, got over their Dark Ages into modernity but Africa dawdled. Indeed, State building was out of consideration given the prevailing insecurity of the time. The below is an apt depiction of the grave scenario:

The entire continent could be imagined as a wild circus of utter chaos and bloodletting. As far as the issues of peace and conflict were concerned, not only is an African state accorded fame and greatness by its revered potentials for aggression...but often also, that acts of interstate aggression and the attendant plunders and usurpations at conquests were their surest industry to livelihoods, opulence and splendor. Many state armies like the Buganda army and Ibadan warriors were granted license to personally plunder such items as ivory, livestock, women, etc. during wars. The liberty to loot had motivated the soldiers and who also were always eager for the next war as soon as they were broke. It was often a kind of large scale interstate armed robberies in form. Consequently, pre-colonial Africa was clearly a jungle in respect of interstate relations. African states were constantly at wars that were often nonsensical and unjust;...for the fun, frivolity and aggrandizement, spoils and slave-raiding. Boundaries were thus in a flux of shifts and obliterations as African states collapse and reconstitute as in a continuum, and all these were at the reckless expense and neglect of political stability for full continental exploration, development and human advancement (Odeyemi 2014).²

However, this historical humanitarian tragedy and recurrent insecurity had predisposed the continent to European imperialism. Indeed, a corollary of the above scenario was that these well-warred African states were usually

² Odeyemi, J. O., A Political History of Nigeria and the Crisis of Ethnicity in Nation-Building. *International Journal of Developing Societies* Vol. 3, No. 1, 2014, 87-95. DOI: 10.11634/216817831403459.

very small in size, and as agreed by Tidy and Leeming (1981)³, they were politically weak to contend with the far superior European states that were then exploring the globe. Firstly, beside the deep-seated instability, the numerous interstate wars had a negative spillover that blossomed into the African slave industry, which in turn, serviced the transatlantic slave trade. However, the shame and brutal experience of Africa in this inhuman trade is outside the scope of this paper. It can only be recalled that some European colonizing powers had justified their colonial ventures on what they called humanitarian motives. Britain in particular had cited the tragic African slave trade (from which she had previously benefitted) as a reason to increase her control over Africa in order to effect its abolition.

Tidy and Leeming (1981) had further asserted, that European Merchants and administrators found it extremely difficult to extract trade agreements with these small and unstable states as they had successfully done with the far bigger states of Asia, South America and the vast Chinese Empire which would enable them to exploit the economic wealth of quite a large area. They consequently urged their governments to make colonies or enlarge existing ones, which would end wars between the small states and thus make possible trade on a larger scale. The later development of the colonial industry made transatlantic slave trade illegal and obsolete. Given this trajectory of insecurity, most African states and societies were too weak and unprepared to resist colonialism when it came. The impact and consequences of colonialism shall be broached in coming sections of this paper, but it further left Africa more disorganized and weakened. The modern African states that were colonially crafted and granted political freedoms have continued to suffer the consequences of colonialism which made economic development, nation-building and human security continuously problematic.

The spate of insecurity had trailed most African states shortly after independence. Some had experienced civil wars particularly from separatist/secessionist or irredentist groups that wanted to obliterate colonial boundaries and go back to their independent pre-colonial existence. Others had struggled with bitter insurgencies from groups seeking to

³ Tidy M. & Leeming D., A History of Africa, 1840-1914. Vol. 2, 1880-1914. Edward Arnold: London, 1981.

contest or takeover the state, usually for its resource control. In other instances, most African states by nature have had to internally contend with bitter group/ethnic rivalries. The 1993 Rwanda Genocide is an unprecedented testimony of insecurity in recent post-colonial history of Africa. Similarly, Somalia has completely failed since the 1990s from the activities of multiple insurgent groups and warlords with over 500,000 guns in between them, while Liberia and Sierra Leone had been on the brinks of collapse before they were propped by interventional efforts. The entire Great Lakes Region has had its share of insurgent destabilizations from the 1990s just as South Africa emerged from its anti-apartheid struggle. Thus, Africa is not unfamiliar with insecurity, particularly from insurgency, and it has trailed the continent as its natural disaster for generations. Right now, Nigeria, Algeria, Tunisia, Mali, Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, and Congo DRC are undergoing different forms of threatening civil strifes. Libya has been in massive turmoil from multiple insurgents since Muammar Gaddafi was deposed and murdered.

Lately however, Africa has been the recipient of an aggravated form of insurgency interlaced with terrorism particularly since the 9/11 al Qaeda attacks on the US. Although, every region of the world today is prone to insurgency and terrorism in different forms and kinds with motives much worse than *Carlos the Jackal's*. *Carlos* was once in history the most infamous terrorist (before Osama bin Laden) for his 1975 notorious claim that "To get anywhere, you have to walk over corpses" (Conway, 1998).⁴ But then, he was Marxist/leftist in political inclination and in his many years of activities before the French nabbed him, he claimed to have murdered only 83 victims. But most insurgent/terrorist groups since 9/11 implacably celebrated bloodbath and mass murders with orgy and would not hesitate to avail themselves the use of weapons of mass destruction. Total terrorism aptly described its extreme cruelty, lunatic modus operandi, and its *no holds barred* attitude to violence and destruction which made David Cameron describe their activities to the British Parliament as 'pure acts of evil'. Without doubt, the continent of Africa, more than any other, is currently

⁴ Henderson W. Conway. *International Relations: Conflict and Cooperation at the Turn of the 21st Century*. Boston, McGraw-Hill: 1998.

under the siege of this variant of nihilistic insurgency and terrorism whose savagery is unprecedented in recent human history.

That Africa is fagged from the protracted insecurity is an underestimation, the continent is rather debilitated. Indeed, for a region that is struggling with development from the rare of all global indexes, it is non-alarmist to declare Africa a beleaguered continent, considering the host of destructive groups that besieged it. Destruction and destabilization spiraled down from Cairo to Cape as the entire region, particularly the Sahel area, undergoes episodic crippling from the viral presence of insurgencies and terror groups operating with transnational morbidity. With most having questionable grievances, diverse gangs of marauders intermix with sectarians and political renegades. Incredibly well armed, members of the groups are well motivated, either from the aphrodisiac effects of faith-based brain conditioning and trained control, or by the various operational indulgences. The groups shared sanctuary, assets and logistics, strategies and styles, and built networks of operational coordination and collaboration, support and solidarity while concertedly using asymmetric attacks and marauding tactics to commit wide-ranging criminality. These include summary executions and mass murders (of innocent victims), illegal abductions and forced disappearances, abuse of children by armed groups, rape, forced marriages, stoning to death, beheadings and butcher fields of horror for human captives, property loots and destructions of human historical treasures. These groups bizarrely compete to outshine one another in acts and levels of human cruelty and notoriety, and their capability has enabled them to engage in territorial hijackings, with dreams to erect caliphates.⁵ Most groups benefit from the private donations and sponsorships of local fifth columnists and other foreign collaborators, but would often resort to, and are particularly effective at thriving on resource thefts and smuggling, armed robbery, extortion, credit card fraud, and kidnapping for ransom. The proceeds further fund the perpetration of their criminality. And quite uniquely in the history of insurgency and terrorism, they genocidally

⁵ Boko haram has proclaimed some areas seized from Nigeria as its caliphate similar to that established by the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL) on territories hijacked from Syria and Iraq.

traverse multiple borders in operation and styles, merchandising pure acts of crude terror and evil, triggering massive displacements and impoverishment.

The transnational nature of the current mode of insurgency and terrorism is most worrisome as these daring groups, occupying enclaves in border areas, are capable of taking on many countries at once, taking advantage of the numerous porous borders of African states to freely interlink.⁶ They are superbly and logistically organized and surreptitiously supported to smuggle supplies and utilities into the enclaves, and enjoy constant fresh recruitment of foreign fighters. They are technologically aided by their use of the latest social media platforms to effectively disseminate their messages, and display their horrific videos of brutality. Their capability is not strange particularly as it is enhanced by the fact that most African states are failing and are in varying degrees of integrity decay. Consequently, the state apparatus for security (intelligence, police, civil defence, military and paramilitary) have either crumbled or weakened, and are unable keep pace with the rapidity of these agents of destabilization. Most African states grossly lacked the requisite personnel and training particularly in counterinsurgency, cyber criminality, and crime scene investigation, anti-money laundering and detecting/countering the financing of terrorism. They as well lacked the resources, infrastructures, and specialized tactical equipment to effectively tackle this kind of insurgency and terrorism.

Further still, the state apparatuses for security lacked the requisite alertness, interagency coordination, and intelligence sharing that could help track and rout the undercover activities of these covert groups. Unfortunately too, most National Armies are grossly demotivated, aggrieved, and compelled to conform to some international human right codes and rules of engagement which seriously constrain their counteractions against the unconventional opponents. The national aphrodisiac 'spirit of legitimacy' may even have failed to stimulate them to victory, while revulsions from terror beheadings and human butchery had successfully and psychologically cowed the bravest of the soldiers. In a game of death, the terrorists currently

⁶ Transnational insurgency must be distinguished from mere civil insurgency. While the latter is localized within a state, the former is interstate in intent and extent, and may even pursue a regional ambition like the Middle East ISIL. However, both forms of insurgencies are subsumed in this paper as plaguing Africa.

ravaging the continent, kill, not for the need, but sheer fun, and are particularly interested in capturing Prisoners of War, not necessarily to negotiate ceasefires and legitimate demands, but for gruesome murders in psychological warfare. In this scenario, death is not the issue; it is rather the mode of the death. This psychological tactic employed by current insurgents and terrorists is achieving tremendous results. Fear and anxiety from beheadings and butchery have successfully disconcerted soldiers and their families. A most recent case is the action of some Nigerian soldiers' wives who protested the deployment of their husbands against Boko Haram terrorists. They were terribly apprehensive that their spouses, well-cultured gentlemen, professionally trained to be humane fighters and humanitarian law-abiding and most dependable at peacekeeping operations around the globe, faced certain gruesome and humiliating death in the process. Members of National Armies consequently mutinied or buckled in despair. They abandoned their posts, and flee at the advance of terror groups. In many scenarios, some African states are overwhelmingly beleaguered by more than one insurgent group.

Of course, many insurgent groups in Africa have civil grievances against their state, which may or otherwise be genuine, but usually in claims of political and economic marginalization which they hoped to settle through arms insurrection. Such is the just defeated M23 rebels in Congo DRC, former fighters who regrouped purportedly for state's renege to appropriately integrate them into the national army as previously negotiated. Another is the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), seeking justice from Nigerian government against oil-related environmental degradation and the economic neglect of their area. However, the kinds of the MEND insurgency, which though can be negotiated and amnestied, are often due to acts of misgovernance by some African leaders. Today however, most insurgent groups have such grievances that are outrightly illogical and difficult to fathom. In this group are usually the faith-based insurgent groups, motivated by sectarian views and are often inspired by, or affiliated to the Al Qaeda, though not precluded to the Islamic faith. Uganda, since early 90s has had running battles with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), an insurgent group which claimed inspiration from the Holy Spirit of God with

dual beliefs in African mysticism and Christian fundamentalism, envisioning the establishment of a theocratic paradise state on earth based on the Ten Commandments.⁷

These set of insurgents, basically composed of radicals and extremists, have unfathomable grievances and missions, and they often act under spurious divine revelations.⁸ Since they are out of tune with concrete reality, they are most uncivil in their approach to insurgency, and having no International Organization or humanitarian law to account, they employ the most inexcusable means, including vicious acts of evil to dominate. They disregard any knowledge of *crimes against humanity* in their modus operandi, and basically take advantage of the general chaos and gross inefficiencies in the region to thrive and hide out. They are some of the most indecent insurgent groups ever known to history, and since their modus operandi was unguided by any concrete ideology, they are usually trailed by confusion and contradictions. They are also known to have admitted wrongdoings and constantly recanting beliefs and actions (Country Reports on Terrorism 2013).⁹ President Obama described them as offering victims nothing but endless slavery to their empty vision and the collapse of any definition of civilized behavior.¹⁰ In desperation and competition for notoriety and terror, they strike with impious lethality, intermixing and cooperating with all kinds of miscreants and depraved minds in their society to synergetically push terrorism to previously unknown levels of disgust. The Boko Haram, for instance, reportedly has resorted to forced conscription¹¹ and recruiting of criminals and thugs (Area Boys), paying them for attacks, sometimes with

⁷ The Lord's Resistance Army gained notoriety in the 90s for their brutal acts of terrorism, and were known to have kidnapped 139 school girls from St. Mary's College Aboke in 1996 for both their sexual and labour exploitations. They were forerunners to the Boko Haram (BH) who similarly and recently in this disgraceful act abducted over 200 Chibok school girls for similar use in Nigeria.

⁸ Joseph Kony at the head of LRA claimed to be acting on orders from God; Abubakar Sekau at the head of BH justified his decisions as based on instructions given to him by Allah. The religions are obviously unrelated, but tactics are the same.

⁹ Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, (April 2014). United States Department of State Publication Bureau of Counterterrorism.

¹⁰ http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/transcript-president-obamas-remarks-on-the-execution-of-journalist-james-foley-by-islamic-state/2014/08/20/f5a63802-2884-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html

¹¹ The most recent of such forced abductions is that of 97 young males on 13th August, 2014 from the remote village of Doron-baga in North-Eastern Nigeria. Most of these would later be integrated into the terror venture.

shares of the spoils, (Crisis Group Africa Report 2014).¹² Due to their inexplicable and weird drive, they are implacable and cunning, difficult to negotiate, and hence are intractable particularly in Africa where most states lacked the requisite statecraft instrument to rout them. Quite unfortunately, this is the current spate of insurgency that is spiraling round the continent and Africa is already benumbed as diverse insurgents continue to tighten their grip on states across the regions unless cogent steps are taken to halt and reverse the trend.

The list is appalling of the insurgent and terror groups that had besieged Africa, and there is hardly a sub-region that is left out. Some are as below:

- Ansar-Beit al Maqdis and other groups with hideouts in the Sinai which has continued to destabilize the post-Morsi Egypt.
- Ansar al-Shari'a operating in Tunisia and Libya, and in the North Africa area.
- Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) operating in Libya.
- AMB was also involved in terrorist attacks in Algeria and Niger.
- Al-Shabaab continued to pose a significant threat in Somalia, Kenya, Burundi, Ethiopia, and the entire East Africa and the Horn of Africa sub-regions.
- Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) threatened local stability in Ethiopia.
- Al-Qaeda had effectively and repeatedly struck Kenya.
- M23 rebel movement was once the deadliest armed group in the East, assassinating local leaders and killing and otherwise intimidating civilians in Congo DRC.
- Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Uganda militant group recently killed civilians in the Beni Territory, North Kivu by hacking and beheading them with machetes.
- Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other violent extremist groups such as MUJAO, and AAD terrorized northern Mali and are potential threats to Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania.¹³

¹² Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency. Crisis Group Africa Report N°216, 3 April 2014 Page17 & 18.

¹³Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, op cit.

- Boko Haram, along with a splinter group commonly known as Ansaru, has transnationally conducted aggravated attacks on Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, thereby acquiring rapidly high global ranking in fearsomeness among similar groups in recent times.
- Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a militant movement, operating in northern Uganda, Congo DRC, South Sudan and the Central African Republic. The LRA remained a threat for communities in Western Equatorial and Western Bahr-el-Ghazal states.
- Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (otherwise known as FDLR) had threatened post-genocide Rwanda.
- The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), had badly hammered Nigeria and almost collapsed its oil-dependent economy before a truce/amnesty was negotiated. Henry Okah, the leader of MEND had used the safe haven of insurgent-free South Africa to strategize for the group in Nigeria.

The Predisposing Factors for Insecurity in Africa: the Dimension of Transnational Insurgency and Terrorism

Africa is second largest of Earth's seven continents, covering 23 percent of the world's total land area and containing 13 percent of the world's population.¹⁴ The entire region could aptly be described as a continental wonder of the world. A touristic land of wonderful diversity, completely secure from some of the world's deadliest natural disasters that frustrate and setback other peoples, and abundantly endowed with myriads of natural/mineral resources, arable lands and climate for mega agro industrial capacities, and sufficiently necessary manpower to tap into these potentials for its exponential economic development. Touted as the birthplace of humanity and the cradle of civilization, many Africans have euphorically idealized that theirs is the richest continent. However, and despite these innumerable potentials, transformation and development seemed a mirage and Africa has remained a lingering concern, the reality of which seemed not to have properly dawned on Africans. African economy, despite the prospects, has not succeeded in prospering its peoples and majority of Africans live in poverty. A major consequence of this is that the continent is

¹⁴ Microsoft Encarta (2009). © 1993-2008 Microsoft Corporation.

currently awash with insurgencies and terrorism in such proportions that are set to plunge the region into further destitution.

To properly understand the factors responsible for the insurgency currently pervading Africa, we must not lose sight of the emergent peculiar legacies of Euro-African history, vis-à-vis, Africa's colonial experience (though already over-flogged) and the mode of formation of modern African states. The intention may be good to create large modern African states (as against the myriads of small and weak pre-colonial states) that could be integrated into the then evolving international system. However, numerous disparate groups, perhaps in hundreds, had to be glued to evolve the current 54 nation-states. This plastic crafting of African states by Europeans have made nation-building strenuous in the post-colonial era. Virtually all African states are heterogeneous in group composition and hence, political culture is chaotic and national unity is difficult. Group differences have ever endured, and national integration remained elusive for most states. The stakes of politics have also ever been too high in most African states as groups with upper political hand often suppressed the others. The losing group(s) consequently resorts to insurgency to seek redress.

The other is related to the *warehouse mentality* of African states, and this is related to the deliberate colonial policies that structuralized African colonial economies into mere resource gardens and product outlets for European industries. It is of course established that the strategic dual needs to outsource raw materials and create external markets were the economic motives that drove the colonial venture. In essence, what the mercantilist European states wanted were overseas warehouses. By and large thus, African states from its cradle were mere colonial warehouses. These are extremely vast, open-air, and territorialized warehouses where raw materials/commodities are stored and goods sold wholesale. A permanent outfall of this is not only that African states were run as overseas subsidiaries of the advanced western economies, but also that Africans became producers of what they don't consume, and consumers of what they don't produce.

There is a peculiar mentality of warehouse states in Africa. This *warehouse mentality* could aptly be captured in Frederick Cooper's conception of Africa's gatekeeper states. By the nature of their political economies, Cooper (2002)¹⁵ had described African states at independence as the emergence of the "gatekeeper states". In his account, leaders of post-colonial nations in Africa sit astride "the interface between the territory and the rest of the world, collecting and distributing resources that derived from the gate itself". Such resources are customs revenue and foreign aid; permit to do business in their territory; entry and exit visas; and permission to move currency in and out. Put differently, post-colonial governments served as gatekeepers, merely indulged and empowered to take-charge and sustain business transactions for the warehouse states of Africa. The set of managers recruited for the warehouse states at political independence did not even need to prosperously manage them but to simply sustain and protract them as warehouses, hence, foreign assistance in every kind were made available for whoever could effectively manage African states as Western warehouses.¹⁶

The above scenario, according to Cooper, inevitably made the stakes of control at a single point too high, making gatekeeper states too vulnerable and problematic in the midst of intense competition for that point. Further in his diagnoses, Cooper contends that African states, like their predecessors (colonial states) had great difficulty getting beyond the limitations of gatekeeper states. This is precisely so since western governments and international institutions were willing to work with such states only on the basis of their malleability and vulnerability and have consequently shut or weakened other forms of their access to the world economy. They were also useful to the West in their Cold War rivalries and calculations. The elites in gatekeeper states were also too willing to be pawns in that they could carve a profitable niche for themselves thereby.

¹⁵Cooper, F., *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

¹⁶Simensen (2010) submits in this wise that for African countries at independence, Development was not necessarily the primary objective of these regimes; their first priority was to tighten political control, control the flow of resources, and develop personal networks rather than building well-functioning public institutions.

According to him, "even a small quantity of resources - a marketing deal, remittances ..., foreign aid, automatic weapons - could make a decisive difference to whoever could control the asset... hence the importance of guarding the gate to those who possess it". But then for Cooper, keeping the gate was mere ambition than actuality, and the struggles for the gate - and efforts of other groups to get around it - bedeviled African states from the start. Cooper submits that "one of the origins of instability in Africa is the inability of the gate keepers to keep the gate", and "even a modest amount of economic or military aid could be a major patronage to a leader, or to an insurgency trying to evade the gate keeping state".

These scenarios provide us with the simple genesis of why/how Africa is stagnated and difficult to develop, and enmeshed in recurrent insecurity. African states have ever been run, even at colonial independence, as warehouse-states and not nation-states. The gate keeper, usually a strong neocolonial comprador, manages the warehouse state in the absolute interest of the metropole state and is deeply rewarded thereby with a guaranteed safe haven for his exploits in the metropole. The end of the Cold War was remarkable as western states no longer needed the international political support of these warehouse states, leading to their abandonment, and ending thereby all comprador-related foreign aid. Most gatekeepers in the post-Cold War period had run the warehouse states as personal estates, developed patrimonial networks of governance composed of patron-clients and cronies, and presided as the despotic exploiters and supreme overlords of their state. This mode of governance obviously engenders social and political injustice, and generated intense rivalries and agitations from groups that felt marginalised, and seeking forcefully instead the control of the gates to the warehouse states. Cooper recollects that Presidents and Prime Ministers used their control of access to import-export markets and revenues to reward followers and exclude rivals. He cited Zaire where a single leader and his shifting entourage extracted resources arbitrarily from poor peasants and rich merchants to such a degree that formal dimension of state rule collapsed.

Africa's elite have ever increasingly behaved as opportune gatekeepers. This mostly explained the numerous coups, countercoups, civil wars, and insurgencies that ever pervaded the region. It explains why Africa has numerous cases of rulers who either rig or cancel lost election bid like Laurent Gbagbo versus Alassane Ouattara in Cote d'Ivoire, or tinker with constitution to sit-tight as attempted but failed by Abdullahi Wade in Senegal and Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria, or successfully by Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. President Obama's admonition that Africa needs strong institutions and not strongmen was perhaps naïve of the political development of Africa. At independence, former African colonies got strongmen who could man the gates and secure the warehouses, and not statesmen who could build the states. Thus, African leaders had to be strong to effectively manage the warehouse states. While their whims are the operating constitutions, cronyism, sycophancy, and clientelism had negated the roles of state institutions. The elite needed not the complements of strong independent institutions to administer the states. This engenders the forceful takeover of state by anyone or group who just could subdue the incumbent, hence, governance is constantly at emergency in Africa.

It is strange, the recent pressures from the West and other International Institutions for Africa to democratize and imbibe the tenets of good governance. Strong independent institutions, good objective and democratic governance are alien to modern Africa by evolution. The region is rather accustomed to despotic strongmen and rent seeking regimes, which are some of the lasting legacies that evolved out of the peculiar Euro-African history. If African states were democratic at all, it is all about politicians taking orderly turns at manning the gates. The transmutation from warehouse state to nationhood-state has consequently been problematic, while governance crises trail Africa in tsunamic proportions. In this scenario, forced depositions, ethnicity, uneven economic development along group lines, civil wars, insurgencies, growing armed robbery/banditry/gangsterism and militancy, arms and drug trafficking, fraud, corruption, extortions, rule of whims against the rule of law, elitist profiteering and treasury looting, theft of state resources, factionalized elitism, human right violations and other

injustices, kidnappings, and wide-ranging criminality have continuously characterized African states and governance, engendering the recurrent insecurity that barraged Africa.

In the ensuing milieu, many African states have either collapsed, failed or are failing with terrible geopolitical consequences. In varying degrees, virtually all African states have suffered the loss of territorial control or the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force, hampered legitimate capacities to collectively decide or provide public services, inability to sovereignly interact with other states. Helman and Ratner¹⁷, among the first analysts to use the term 'failed state', were particularly concerned about 'a disturbing new phenomenon' whereby a state was becoming 'utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community'. They argued that a failed state would '[imperil] their own citizens and [threaten] their neighbours through refugee flow, political instability and random warfare'. Fearon & Laitin¹⁸, for instance, argue that failed states create 'international public bads', and other negative spillovers such as harbouring criminal organisations. And what more can be said than that Africa is the most failed continent in the world. Of the worst twenty states classified on the Failed States List in 2011, fourteen of them are sadly African. It is therefore not strange that Africa is currently beleaguered by transnational insurgents and terrorists who freely roam between the states to wreak havoc. For as long as these endure, insecurity will continue to trail and pervade the region, and economic development may be far from Africa.

Impact of Transnational Insurgency and Terrorism on African Economic Development and Integration

There is no gainsaying the fact that Africa's economic development has been held at the jugular by the destructive activities of the many insurgent and terror groups transnationally on rampage on the continent. Their actions have rolled back investments, cowed civilians, confounded national armies and rattled governments, and these are four important dimensions through

¹⁷Helman G.B and Ratner S.R., Saving Failed States. *Foreign Policy*. No. 89 (Winter, 1992-1993), pp. 3-20

¹⁸Fearon J.D and Laitin D.D., Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *American Political Science Review* 97, 1 (March 2003): 75-90.

which the impact of transnational insurgency and terrorism may be analysed in Africa.

The People

Africa is monumentally threatened because manpower, the very first indispensable ingredient for any economic development/integration, has been endangered in what could be termed demographic tragedy. The peoples are the very first victims of the pervasive insecurity. Jean-Paul Azam¹⁹ lamented the loss of manpower suffered as a result of terror attacks which had resulted in the deaths of university professors, quality academic and teachers, medical personnel, engineers, scientists, promising students, business peoples, bureaucrats, gallant military and paramilitary officers. The Boko Haram group in Nigeria is known to have murdered about 10,000 persons since 2009. For those that are surviving, there is palpable despair and disorientation in population centers of countries under insurgency. Peoples directly under the captivity of insurgents have lost their freedoms and way of life, while many others, who could, have fled at the approach of terror groups. While the numbers of international refugees are soaring in Africa, with the attendant economic crises, there is also a rising profile in the incidence of the Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs)²⁰ particularly in states under insurgency since the beginning of the millennium. The Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the situation in Mali reported that since April 2012, more than 470,000 persons have fled and sought refuge in neighbouring countries.²¹ Impoverished countries like Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Kenya have further groaned about coping with the burden of refugees fleeing insurgency and counterinsurgency activities in Nigeria, Mali and Somalia.

The result is chronic and sustained human flight of professionals and intellectuals streaming out of Africa to the advanced economies. Another is

¹⁹Azam J., Why Suicide-Terrorists Get Educated, and What to Do About It. Public Choice, vol. 153, n. 3-4, 2012, p. 357-373.

²⁰As at the World Humanitarian Day, 2014, Nigerian officials reported that the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in North-Eastern Nigeria numbered over 600,000 peoples.

²¹Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali. United Nations Security Council, S/2013/189. Distr.: General, 26 March 2013.

the massive displacements of peoples particularly from forced uprooting of large communities, particularly of peasants, which will further aggravate the problems of continental underdevelopment, food shortages, destitution, disease, infant mortality rates, business failures, and many other humanitarian tragedies that the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were set to eradicate. The sub-Sahara area is currently plagued with the highest number of *children out of school* in the world. The number of *children out of school* in sub-Saharan Africa has remained at about 30 million over the last five years, meaning that more than one-half of the world's *out-of-school children* live in sub-Saharan Africa.²² The attack by Al-Shabaab on Garisa University, Kenya, which massacred well over 100 students in 2015 had forced the university to close down. The same group had earlier in 2014 conducted a gruesome raid on a prominent shopping mall in Nairobi, killing over sixty international shoppers and business owners, and causing much of the complex to destroy.

The Sahel area of the sub-Sahara had further incurred multiple tragedies. The area already noted for being drought-prone, has now been worst hit by insurgency and terrorism, leaving its inhabitants with multiple anguish. As farmers flee their lands for safety, the alarm of famine and starvation now rings across the region. The entire Southern Somalia is currently under siege by Al-Shabaab cutting off supplies and escape routes to peoples. This strategy of doom is aimed at gradually reducing the people and livestock through slow but painful death from disease, famine and starvation. On the whole, for a region that comprised of many desperately poor states, and in dire need of development, the tragedies constitute gross depletion of its productive human capital. Moreover, the humanitarian crises constituted double burden on the strained purse of the United Nations and the African Union, through their double provisions of humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping forces.

²²Schooling for millions of children Jeopardised by reductions in aid. UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS). UIS FACT SHEET JUNE 2013, No.25.

The Economy

Perhaps the most worrisome angle to the consequences of transnational insurgency and terrorism in Africa is the economic development and integration hopes that are dimming. For a region that had once been a *scar on the conscience of the world*, and whose ailing economies are being concertedly nursed back to life by international efforts, the least expected in the nascent millennium is multiple insurgencies. Quite interestingly and recently, Africa had begun to experience a turnaround in international trade driven by strong commodity prices. Indeed, Africa's exports reportedly grew faster than any other region in the world in 2012 at 6.1%.²³ However, the rising profile of insurgencies has affected economic productions across the region. Farmers and individuals are involved in the production of most of these commodities have been killed or dislocated.

For instance also, the crisis affected economic production and basic public services, triggered the suspension of official development assistance, and the abandonment of many investment projects in Mali.²⁴ Mali's fate is replicated in many states with chronic problem of insecurity. Insurgency is drying up foreign direct investment across Africa apart from wasting their meager resources generated from their usual petty commodity trading, straining further their efforts to survive. In countries like Egypt and Kenya it has hampered tourism, which is the mainstay of their economies. Nigeria's economy was on its knees until truce was negotiated with MEND in the South-South, but the gains of the truce is been wasted in the effort to contain the boko haram in the North East. Infrastructures for trade, development and integration, residential buildings, schools, public utilities and other economic assets are being bombed out or forced to close down. Battling insurgency has stultified agendas on economic development in many African states with strained states U-turning from progressive governance, to dissipating energies on crises management, and diverting chunk budgetary provisions to combating insecurity. The Nigerian government, despite its huge oil exports, had to take a billion dollar loan to purchase necessary

²³AfDB, OECD, UNDP 2014. Chapter 3, Trade policies and regional integration in Africa.
www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/outlook.

²⁴Ibid.

equipment to confront Boko haram.²⁵ A billion dollar loan for Nigeria, whose industrial bane is its recurrent epileptic electricity supply, to fight insurgency is a colossal waste.²⁶ Several other billions of dollars shall be needed in the reconstruction of damaged infrastructures, businesses, schools and residential buildings. In the end, while the industrial capacities of African states waned, the peoples are further doomed to poverty due to business and job losses and the investment lockdown.

The Military

Besides that African militaries are confounded by its asymmetric nature, efforts at containing transnational insurgency and terrorism have completely overwhelmed states' armed forces, and the defense of the region is in gross jeopardy. Most African militaries had lacked the necessary tact, training and right equipment, and are either demotivated, demoralized or aggrieved by variety of factors which makes them unlikely to effectively contain terror-driven insurgencies. The consequences of misgovernance in many countries had resulted in the loss of zeal by many soldiers to continue risking their lives in the defense of their countries. Soldiers in Nigeria are particularly demoralized by corruption at the military high command. In some scenario, state armies have operated in hostile environments particularly where the hosting communities have withheld intelligence that could aid the success of military operations. Some of the militaries had been overstretched while battling insurgencies simultaneously on multiple fronts, and this is apart from having further peacekeeping commitments to international organisations like the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN). The South Sudanese army had contributed to the AU Regional Task Force against the LRA, but had to be redeployed at the end of 2013 to counter civil insurgency. Some, like the two Sudanese, the Chadian and Zairian armies, despite being well-warred, had been fatigued fighting endless insurgencies since independence, and were too frail to confront the rampaging insurgencies. The unconventional nature of recent insurgencies

²⁵ Jonathan Seeks \$1 bn Loan to Fight Boko haram. July 16, 2014. www.punchng.com/news/jonathan-seeks-1bn-loan-to-fight-boko-haram/

²⁶ It has since been revealed, following President Jonathan's defeat in 2015 Elections, that while Nigeria was begging for the weapon's loan, that same 2014 year, the military hierarchy was busy diverting, for personal enrichment, over \$15 billion budgeted fund meant for the same purpose.

has outrightly dislocated many national armies. The Nigerian military, earlier cited, is prototypic of national armies that have lost courage at tackling terrorism. African soldiers risked their lives under the encumbrance of humanitarian rules of engagement which had greatly incapacitated them in combating irregular and lawless fighters, and many had died or had to flee in the process. A very disturbing report which casts doubt on the ability of national armies to counter the rampaging insurgencies is the case of some 480 Nigerian soldiers that deserted battlefield and fled from Boko Haram into Cameroon.²⁷ It was too shocking for the Nigerian Army to admit hence they first described it a stray, and then, a tactical maneuvering into Cameroon. It is however established that the Nigerian army had foundered before terror-driven insurgency. The danger is that the growing incapability of African militaries is fast exposing African populations to despair and death from these genocidal groups.

The Government

Most African governments battling transnational insurgency are currently at their wits' end to win the war on terror. Unfortunately too, many of the states had suffered from multiple institutional weaknesses that impeded any counterterrorism efforts. The business of government has been put on hold for crises management in the war rooms. They had been rattled by the way their territories are being hijacked, and the incapacitation of their militaries to roll back the insurgencies and halt their brutality on the people. Most governments now operate state of emergency and have had to abandon developmental planning for damage control, quite sadly, for a continent in dire need of progressive agendas. Governments have come under scathing criticisms in their methods which were mostly failing at handling the terror groups. The Nigerian government has been severely criticized by local and international groups who constantly protested its inability to rescue the kidnapped Chibok school girls. The absence of genuine unity among African leaders has made it problematic to essentially collaborate in their efforts to effectively deal with the transnational nature of the insurgency. Nigeria had to appeal to France diplomacy in order to bring its French neighbours - Chad,

²⁷Boko Haram: Row over 'desertion' of 480 soldiers. THE NATION, Vol. 9, No. 2951, 27th August, 2014.

Cameroon and Niger - to collaborate in dealing with the transnational nature of the Boko haram.

The Issues and Tasks for Regional (Economic) Integration in Africa

So much dust has been raised regarding economic integration in Africa. Misconceptions had taken place in many quarters about regional integration whose origin many had traced to the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. However, the argument here is the denial of the idea of African integration. In fact, the paper reasonably proves that African integration in every sense had been a ruse ab initio, and its absence had culminated in this pervasive insecurity. The issues are multipronged to clear the misconceptions about regional integration arrangements in Africa. The issues are as below:

The Incongruity of African States to Economically Integrate

Ordinarily, regional integration refers to the process, often, in which adjoining states take advantage of their geopolitical contiguity to forge a pact that would engender greater, fruitful, and multipronged cooperation through common institutions and rules. A consequence or follow-up to that is the merging of the involved economies to establish regional market for trade and investment (economic integration) which would be operationally guided through the earlier established common institutions and rules. But regional economic integration involves the shedding of some measures of sovereignty by states involved, resulting in the removal of all barriers to free intra-regional trade, movement of peoples, labour, capital and goods, including reduction of tariffs and excise duties. The ultimate aim is to increase efficiency, specialization and productivity gains. It has greater prospects for the welfare and prosperity of all peoples in the region, and as well, capable of engendering policies that would deter threats to regional security.

Several reasons make the accomplishment of this difficult. The colonial origins of African states have created deep, long-lasting divisions which had orientated most states to their former different colonial mentors; hence, attaining regional solidarity is often arduous. The first loyalty of most

African states in matters of international relations is to their former master and this is very particular of French-Afrique. The yearly summit of the *Organisation Internationale de La-Francophonie* together with the regular provisions of varieties of post-independence aids and trades, and the direct monetary dependence of *Communauté Financière Africaine* which made CFA francs freely convertible with the French Franc has always secured the French-Afrique solidarity against any genuine all-African unity. To get the cooperation of the French-Afrique, non-Francophone Africa may resort to France diplomacy as Nigeria did above. This undermined national independence and created the overdependence of Francophone Africa on Paris even for strategic survival. The post-election violence in Cote d'Ivoire between Gbagbo and Ouattara, the balkanization of Mali by Tuareg rebels and AQIM, the post-Djotodia civil sectarianism in Central African Republic could not be resolved by the ECOWAS and the African Union until France stepped in with its military might. These have also undermined the possibility of providing African solution to Africa's problems. There could be no provision for collective regional security, which is crucial to countering the menace of transnational insurgency and terrorism in Africa.

In similar vein, the European Community had successfully integrated Africa into neo-colonial economic blocs. Very prominent here is the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) in which 48 states from Sub-Saharan Africa entered into trade agreement with the European Union in 1975. Officially called the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, the trade pact provided African states with guaranteed prices for commodities sold to the EU. This surreptitious plan had circumvented, ab initio, the possibility of any African (economic) development and integration. This explains why the various integrative efforts instituted in Africa had failed or weakened.

African Leadership Mediocrity

For ages now, Africa has had a chronic problem of leadership failure. The region, particularly the sub-Sahara, had been bereft of quality leadership, and this had been the bane of Africa's development. The continent, so incredibly secured from ruinous natural calamities and also naturally infused with capacities for economic advancement, is however unfortunate to be

constantly plagued with leadership tsunamis. The right leaderships and foresights propelled Europeans into global conquest. These are not times for negritude when Africans basked in spurious self-adulation even under captivity. Without being derogatory, African leaders, ancient and modern, have repeatedly demonstrated low quality of intellect than required for that office. Plato, the Greek Philosopher recognized the seriousness in the business of government when he recommended the enthronement of Philosopher Kings. The buffoonery of Idi Amin Dada in Uganda comes readily to mind about the many weak-minded fools that ruled Africa. Clement Isong, the Central Bank Governor during Gen. Gowon's regime had mediocrely bragged that money (when Nigeria experienced stupendous inflow of petrodollars in the aftermath of 1973 Arab oil embargo) was not Nigeria's problem but how to spend it.²⁸ This is gross lack of foresight and poverty of ideas about the needs of state building, and that was not peculiar to Nigeria.

When African states experienced rise in commodity prices, rather than invest the extra income into the future, and transform their commodity-gardening states into industrial economies, they foresee no need than to engage the excess funds in projects that could add no value to their peoples, and they may out rightly embezzle it. A good example was Jean Bedel Bokassa, son of a commoner and sergeant with the French Army who seized power in the poverty-stricken Central African Republic, and later crowned himself the Emperor of Central African Empire with the help of France at a lavish ceremony that cost the equivalent of the CAR's annual budget on a single day.²⁹ But these are the kinds of wasteful, low intellect comprador leaders that Europeans wanted to ensure that African states remained largely gatekeeper/warehouse states.³⁰

²⁸ Slocum-Bradley N., *Promoting Conflict or Peace through Identity*. Burlington: Ashgate, 2008.

²⁹ *Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State*. *Crisis Group Africa Report N°136*, 13 December 2007.

³⁰ President De Gaulle initially wanted nothing to do with Bokassa for deposing the malleable David Dacko who was supported by French colonialists in 1965, calling him "a bloody idiot" with whom "one would never be able to do anything" and refused to receive him. He finally accepted Bokassa, three years later after he'd been found pliable and called him a "good bloke". See *Crisis Group Africa Report N°136*, op.cit.

Attitudinal/Institutional Problems in Africa Leadership

Closely related to the above is the conclusion reached by Gunnar Myrdal that institutions and attitudes are the most important factors in economic progress.³¹ The attitude of African elite to developmental governance is questionable. A cross section of African leadership reveals a disturbing array of opportunists, the accidental, and the predatory elite in government. Some came into power just because they could lead insurrection to wrest the gates to the warehouse states. Others rode into power on group's horses to pursue narrow interests. Ultimately, they lacked the technical knowhow and outrightly misuse state powers, by either milking the state or grounding the state to halt. Michel Djotodia forced out the government of President François Bozizé in 2013 with the help of Chadian Muslim Seleka fighters.

When the Seleka group began to unleash sectarian and criminal violence on the people, Djotodia confessed his inability to halt that trend which eventually grounded CAR to a halt. Regional leaders forced him to quit office few months later. President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria once claimed not to be 'a lion leader' and refused to be called 'Commander in Chief' of the Nigerian Armed Forces. Although this is a publicity stunt aimed at endearing self to the people, he however has betrayed his incapability to wield power, which is a crucial factor of leadership in modern states. It is thus not surprising, his inability thus far, to either halt the onslaught of Boko Haram on the Nigerian state, or checkmate his lieutenants from stealing or diverting the public funds at their disposal. In most African states, institutions are deliberately and grossly weakened or undermined to pave way for state's governance at whims. In a mockery of statesmanship, perpetuation of the big-man rule and wanton disregard for institutionalism, Emperor Jean Bokassa once simultaneously headed ten ministries.³²

In the end, Africa refuses to develop, and poverty is rampant within the peoples. Poverty, in turn, had been established as a contributory factor that fueled transnational insurgency (insecurity) on the continent. For a paltry sum of US\$3000, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) has

³¹ Gunnar Myrdal. *The Challenge of World Poverty. A World Antipoverty Program in Outline*, London: Penguin Press, 1970.

³² *Crisis Group Africa Report N°136*, op.cit.

established that Boko Haram recruited unemployed Nigerian youths to prosecute transnational insurgency against Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger.³³ As hostages to poverty mentality themselves, Africa's leaders continuously loot the state to stash away more than enough to outlast their family after them. They end up misgoverning their state. This partly explains why Africa has not had great names like Winston Churchill, George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, or Lee Kwan Yew. Yew, through his restrictive and altruistic rule, and self-discipline, transformed the city-state island of Singapore into a hub of international trade and prosperity in the Far East. Catastrophic leadership remains the only devastating natural disaster in Africa and the worst that any society could have. It has brought much worse calamities on Africa than any deluge, tsunami or volcano. There is the urgent need, thus, to declare emergency at African leadership.

The Tasks for the Economic Revival of Africa

The tasks are daunting unless the leadership of Africa undergoes a rebirth and undertake measures that would encourage continental economic recovery, development, integration, and collective security, only then would it create the necessary prosperity and capacities that would put on hold the rampaging transnational insurgency and terrorism. Some of the measures are as below:

African Leadership Rebirth

The deficit in the intellectual currency of leadership must be critically addressed if Africa must takeoff from its stagnation, and the takeoff point for Africa beyond 2020 should be the coming into leadership of African elites with a mental departure from the past and present. The mental departure here refers to the emergence of quality elite with a right attitude to governance and the mindset and commitment for state-building and not rent-seeking. These are non-avaricious and law-abiding leaders and technocrats, prepared to sacrifice for the development of their country. Put differently, leadership greed must give way to sacrificial leadership, and ulteriorly motivated ambitions cum buffoonery and mediocrity must be replaced by restrictive men with statecraft acumen. Africa truly needed not

³³How Boko Haram recruits Niger Republic youths with \$3,000. Nigerian Tribune. 23rd April, 2014.

strongmen but strong institutions as popularly opined by President Obama. However, Africa is also in dire need of strong, but cultured and disciplined statesmen that could strengthen state's institutions into effectiveness and manage its resources in a value-added manner. The popularity of democratic governance does not imply that weaklings must come into power because fifth column groups abound in every state and must be outwitted. The Jonathan's *no-lion-leadership* cited above is rather naïve of Obama's decrial of Africa's strongmen and weak institutions. The wanted leaders that would project Africa into the future must be men of departure, well-grounded and firm in the art of statecraft.

Evolution of Genuine all-African Solidarity

There is the urgent need for African leaders to genuinely unite. It must be on record that unity has never been among the African leadership, and without unity, there can be no cooperation, and without cooperation, there can be no integration. The OAU 1963 charter, Article 2, section 1(a) opened with an unheeded call for members" to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States". About forty years later, when the OAU transformed into the AU, its Constitutive Act, Article 3 (a) reiterated the objective to achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa. But this is counterfactual because unity is of one essence and value; and it is unquantifiable although it could be intensified in effect. There is no greater or smaller unity. It is either there is unity or none.

However, the incongruity factors, above-discussed, have always circumvented the hopes of unity. What the OAU had in 1963 was mere cooperation and joint determination to rise above the dangerous background of their political independence - the Cold War, and to concert their efforts at helping other colonies regain their independence. The region of Africa has been the most fragmented and disoriented ideologically and idiosyncratically. It takes the right leadership to rise above these dividing sentiments, most often induced externally, to evolve the right atmosphere for integration. Neocolonial ties to former masters, now turned mentors, must be severed to pave way for genuine all-African solidarity and effective geopolitical diplomacy. The continuous recourse to France by the Anglophone states to

broker the cooperation of Francophone neighbours to counter transnational insurgency will continue to undermine Africa's mutual security.

Similarly, the continuous intervention by France, or other external diplomacy, to contain insecurity within Africa will continue to jeopardize the conflict response mechanisms of the African Union. And for as long as it takes for Africa to rise above its colonial legacy of fragmentation, African integration, and homegrown solution to Africa's multispectral problem shall remain mythical. Similarly, African heterogeneous states must strive against sectionalism to attain true national integration as a starting recipe for geopolitical/economic integration.

Evolution from Commodity Gardening to Industrial Economy

If Africa must economically advance and integrate, the region must evolve from commodity gardening to industrial economy and this is very crucial. Moreover, warehouse/gatekeeper state economies don't integrate, only industrial economies do. In fact, one of the most distinctive features of intra-European Community trade liberalization, which culminated in the European Economic Community and later the European Union, has been the growth of intra-industry trade.³⁴ The commodity/resource based economies have no basis for integration since they are merely primary materials, but the industrially processed and finished goods have greater market value and suitability for economic advancement, prosperous international trade and geopolitical/economic integration. Currently, commodities dominate Africa's international trade and hence, there remains room (and the urgency) for diversification and significant scaling up in manufacturing value-added and services trade.³⁵ The certain impossibility of regional economic integration in the present is aptly captured by the submission below, of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa:

The production and export structures of most African economies are geared to primary commodities such as minerals, timber, coffee, cocoa, and other raw materials, for which demand is externally oriented. Most

³⁴Andre Sapir. Regional Integration in Europe. Economic Papers, Number 94 September 1992. The Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, Belgium.

³⁵AfDB, OECD, UNDP 2014, Op.cit.

lack the industrial capacity for diversified manufactured goods to support trade within regional markets. (And) that Africa's non-oil exports are concentrated in very few products, none of which are important as regional imports. Sub-Saharan African countries appear to have relatively few goods to trade with each other. An analysis of historical changes in the other countries' exports indicates that the "non-complementarity" problem in African trade cannot be resolved quickly.³⁶

The colonial economy of resource gardening for European industries must halt since currently; Europe remains the main market for African (commodity) exports.³⁷ But this is pre-planned by Europe through the postcolonial integration of African states into the ACP-EU arrangements, in which the fate of Africa is sealed as the commodity partners of European industries. As far back as 1963, the EU has signed a convention in Yaoundé, Cameroon, offering commercial, technical, and financial cooperation to 18 African countries, mostly former French and Belgian colonies. This has since increased to 48 countries of the 54 in Africa. This perfect ploy proactively scuttled the industrial and development initiatives of Africa in an economic structuralisation that also destined African states as warehouse economies, thereby also perpetuating the consumption of what they don't produce, and the production of what they don't consume. It is also the reason why former colonial powers, for as much as possible, supported comprador elements, who were malleable and ductile, to assume leadership of their states at independence. However, it is increasingly alarming that Africa has endured as warehouse states, but not only as warehouses to Europe, but increasingly to the US, Asian dragons and lately, China.

This is not to discountenance the existence of some forms of industrialization. For instance, intra-African exports of manufactured goods were worth USD 103 billion in 2012 or 16.4% of total merchandise exports, but this was just 0.9% of total global exports, and hence, the level is extremely low for any meaningful economic integration.³⁸ It is laughable for

³⁶Assessing Regional Integration in Africa IV: Enhancing Intra-African Trade. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2010, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

³⁷AfDB, OECD, UNDP 2014, Op.cit.

³⁸ Ibid.

Africa to beg for a fair share of global trade in a world of steep competition. Nations struggle to eke out trading opportunities via hard-work and the need or quality worth of their products. The Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community is a good action plan to jump-start economic development, but states have been very slow or reluctant to implement them for reasons earlier discussed. The infrastructures for economic integration have not been properly put in place. For instance, freight services between African states are still being provided by European logistics. Similarly, tariffs on intra-African trades needs to be reduced or scrapped, but most African states with their gatekeeper economies depend intricately on customs revenue. Africa must break into the global value chain of goods and services to attract quality foreign direct investment. It must develop industrial capacities to be prosperous.

Although Africa has been attempting to economically integrate, particularly as seen with the eight regional economic communities, but while regional integration has accelerated and deepened elsewhere in the world, it is however very slow and result-unyielding in Africa. This has made some member-states to pursue alternative arrangements with the formation of new alliances and trading blocks. South Africa, for example is very committed to its economic alliance with Brazil, Russia, India and China, the BRICS group. This is capable of undermining Africa's integration.

Conclusion

There is the need to work concertedly on Africa's economic integration as it will increase the level of interaction among the 54 states, with regard to economic, security, political, or social and cultural issues. It is also bound to generate prosperity progress for African peoples. However, the current wave of transnational insurgency and terrorism is bound to frustrate the bid. Efforts must be undertaken, to ensure that this virulent insecurity problem is stamped out. It must be noted that this mode of transnational insurgency and terrorism is unconventional, and hence, stamping it must also take unconventional scheming. Humanitarian law must be reworked, while special and emergency rules of engagement must be developed hurriedly to help national armies deal with its unconventional nature. Amendments have to

be made against those human right codes that incapacitate National Armies when they confront unconventional insurgent groups. The rapidly spreading virus of terrorism has made the entire world to be at emergency and its danger to civility and human security must be acknowledged by every stakeholder. These include nation-states, United Nations Organisation, International Criminal Court, Human Right Watch, Amnesty International, European Union and other Regional Organisations, and the religious groups. Africa needs international cooperation to overcome the insecurity challenges.

Also, the problem of "non-complementarity" of intra-African exports must be resolved, though not quickly as earlier noted, hence the adoption of the time frame of beyond year 2020 by this paper. It is also expected that rolling back this transnational insurgency and its negative effects will take some time. However, and with care not taken against the transnational insurgency and terrorism, danger looms ahead of the continent. If Africa must retrieve from monumental tragedy impending, the task is apparently urgent, Regional integrators must come clean to accept the deep-seated colonial legacies of fragmentation, leadership woes and the economic inhibitions, and so must of essence reevaluate, reconceptualise and re-strategize. Secrets of integration and developmental futures reasonably embed in committed multiple policy departures, in-house Africa, not neocolonial interventions or solidarities.

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